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Internal auditing emerged early in the Twentieth 
Century as a subsidiary activity of accounting <Sawyer,1981, 
p.18). Internal auditors were usually employed in the ac-
counting department and checked routine accounting activi-
ties. Their primary concern was compliance with financial 
accounting controls. 
Over more than five decades, internal auditors' respon-
sibilities have grown to include evaluation of operations 
and management controls. This evaluation encompasses what 
have come to be known as the ''Three E 's" Efficiency, 
Economy, and Effectiveness <Morse, 1971; Nich, et al., 
1987). According to Morse (1971 > the purpose of Operational 
Auditing is "to identify opportunities for greater effi-
ciency and economy or for improved effectiveness in carrying 
out procedures or operations." 
Internal Auditing has not, however, always succeeded in 
its new role as Operational Auditing. Nich, et al. <1987) 
state that two of the reasons for this lack of success are 
that "internal auditors are neither organizationally posi-
tioned nor particularly competent to play a broader role Cas 
operational auditors]" (p.4). Nich, et al. <1987) recognize 
the relevance of attempting to evaluate efficiency, economy, 
and effectiveness. They state, however, that operational 
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auditors cannot always perform that function because of 
deficiencies in extant operational auditing methods. They 
believe that the deficiencies stem in part from the transac-
tional orientation in Operational Auditing methods that has 
been carried over from Financial Auditing methods. 
One obvious solution to the problem of deficient meth-
odologies, and one proposed by Nich, et al. <1987) is to 
adopt various methods of other, related disciplines. Two 
areas they suggest are Information Systems and Industrial 
Engineering. Other disciplines could be suggested. This 
paper, however, proposes the adoption of one particular 
methodology, Socio-Technical Systems Analysis <STSA>, as an 
appropriate methodology for Operational Auditing. 
STSA is a design and analysis approach that attempts to 
jointly optimize both technical and social system needs of 
the organization. "The STS approach views the organiza-
tional control system as a network of interacting and inter-
dependent subsystems'' <Thomas, 1985). The four steps of a 
Socio-Technical Analysis are the Organizational Scan, the 
Technical System Analysis, the Social System Analysis, and 
the Design, Analysis, Redesign Effort. The four steps 
systematically link a study of the organization's goals and 
objectives to an analysis of policies and procedures and, 
ultimately, an identification of problems and possible solu-
tions. 
Chapter I of this paper will discuss in detail the 
extant operational auditing methodology. Chapter II will 
discuss in more detail the goals and objectives of opera-
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tional auditing, and possible reasons why the goals and 
objectives are not currently being met. The progress of 
Operational Auditing toward a more systems oriented view of 
the organization is demonstrated. 
Chapter III of this paper will present the theory and 
background of STSA, and STSA is proposed as a methodology 
that could be incorporated into Operational Auditing method-
ology in order to alleviate some of the existing problems. 
Chapter III includes the rationale for proposing STSA as an 
Operational Auditing methodology. Chapter IV will present 
an example of the STSA process adapted for operational 
auditing use. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTERNAL AUDIT METHODOLOGY 
Introduction: Internal Auditing Functions 
Internal auditing is an increasingly important function 
in businesses, yet because it is a relatively recent 
development, some confusion exists as to its exact role 
within the organization. The internal audit function is to 
some degree prescribed by the management of the particular 
organization within which it exists, and so no definition or 
description of the function should be considered absolute. 
The Institute of Internal·Auditors <IIA> furnishes the 
following definition of internal auditing: 
Internal auditing is 
function established 
examine and evaluate 
to the organization. 
an independent appraisal 
within an organization to 
its activities as a service 
< Brink , 1 982 , p • 3 > 
Internal auditing exists to assist management by examining 
activities in relation to organizational goals and objec-
tives. Thornhill <1981, p. 29> states that the internal 
auditor provides "objective anal.,yses, appraisals, recom-
mendations, and pertinent comment" concerning the activities 
reviewed and the congruence <or lack thereof> of activities 
with goals. 
Thornhill further states that another way to think of 
internal auditing is as a control function which examines 
1 0 
1 1 
and evalustea other controla. He clsaaifiea theae other 
controls as pertaining to organizational structure; policies 
and procedures; accounting and historical records; perform-
ance standards; and reporting and the information system. 
The internal auditor determines whether the organizational 
structure promotes efficiency and effectiveness through 
policies and procedures that are economical, adequate, 
understood, and followed <Cadmus, 1964, p. 13>. Similarly, 
the internal auditor is concerned that standards exist for 
measuring efficiency in the resources used by the organiza-
tion <Brink, 1982, p. 14). Internal auditors also review 
the reliability and integrity of financial accounting 
information, as well as the means used to report such 
information within the company <Brink, 1982, p. 44). 
The internal auditor pursues his examination of 
controls through the avenues of financial and operational 
auditing. Internal auditing started out in the early 1900s 
when "internal auditors were usually employed in the 
accounting department where they checked routine financial 
activities. They sought to determine whether other employ-
ees were complying with financial and accounting procedures, 
whether assets were maintained under appropriate security, 
and whether there were any indications of fraud or other 
wrongdoing" <Sawyer, 1981, p. 18>. Financial auditing is 
primarily concerned with internal accounting control and 
retains a pronounced similarity to public <external) 
auditing. Indeed, internal auditors may work closely with 
public auditors to ensure an effective internal control 
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system. 
Management soon realized, though, that the internal 
auditor's unique knowledge both of the business and of 
accounting controls made the Internal Audit function a 
suitable candidate for expanded responsibility in evaluating 
operations and administrative controls. Internal auditing 
provides an independent viewpoint and, due to the its 
interaction with diverse components of the business, can 
provide a department's management with information it needs 
to formulate a more accurate picture of its role within the 
company. Brink <1982, p. 4) notes that "internal auditors 
who do their jobs effectively become experts in what makes 
for the best possible design and implementation of all types 
of control." 
Within both financial and operational auditing, 
internal auditing is concerned.with three basic issues. The 
first issue is whether controls have been devised and 
implemented that will help management attain the organi-
zation's goals and objectives. This necessitates an 
understanding on the part of the auditor of the goals and 
objectives of the entity under audit. Only with such an 
understanding can the internal auditor delineate which 
controls are necessary, and whic~ types will be effective in 
achieving particular control objectives. 
Once the internal auditor determines that existing or 
proposed controls are appropriate, the second function is to 
test the existing controls for compliance. Even though a 
control mechanism is theoretically effective, it will not in 
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reality be effective unleee it ie operating ae intended. 
Finally, the auditor evaluates the quality of the 
entity's performance in carrying out its responsibilities. 
This evaluation is intended to "ascertain whether the 
organization's objectives and goals have been achieved" 
<IIA, 1978, p. 17; Brink, 1982, p. 42>. This evaluation 
extends to the organization's strategic goals and objectives 
(Thornhill, 1981, pp. 29-30)- or, as Campfield notes, the 
internal auditor "reviewCsJ and evaluateCsJ management's 
planning and performance at various levels of responsibi-
lity" (p. 33). It is in this area that internal auditing 
shifts from a departmental (functional) perspective to an 
inter-departmental (organizational) perspective <Sawyer, -
1981J p. 114).1 The rest of this chapter discusses the 
methodology used to accomplish the internal audit functions. 
Internal Audit Methodology 
The audit programs for both financial and operational 
auditing tend to follow similar formats, which are related 
to the more general internal audit objectives and functions 
discussed in the previous sections. Since numerous authors 
have proposed various partitionings of the audit process, a 
brief discussion of these divergent <yet similar) viewpoints 
is necessary. 
Cadmus (1964), Sawyer <1981) and Thornhill (1981) all 
promulgate four major steps: Familiarization (or Preliminary 
Survey>; Verification (or Field Work); Evaluation and 
Recommendation; and Reporting. Morse (1971) gives four 
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steps also, but they are the Preliminary Survey of the 
Activity; Familiarization (studying the charter or assign-
ment of responsibilities>; a study of the Policies and 
Procedures of the entity; and Reporting of Results. This 
list could be considered deficient as there appears to be no 
link from familiarization activities to the drawing of 
conclusions. 
Brink.and Witt (1982) delineate seven steps in the 
audit process: Familiarization <in the office>; Familiari-
zation in the Field; Verification; Analysis; Evaluation; 
consideration of means to achieve greater effectiveness; and 
prompting management to implement needed changes. Kropatkin 
<1984>, however, provides the most unwieldy list with 
thirty-nine steps in the audit process.2 These steps can be 
categorized into the following four stages: Preliminary 
Survey; Survey in the Field; Verification; and Summation. 
From reviewing these lists, a pragmatic conclusion 
might be that the internal audit process consists of four 
necessary steps. These steps would most likely take the 
form of those promulgated by Cadmus, Sawyer, and Thornhill. 
Within the basic categories of Familiarization, Verifi-
cation, Evaluation and Recommendation, and Reporting all of 
the other lists could be classified, without omitting any 
necessary activities. Having reached this consensus, each 
step will next be discussed in detail. 
Step I - Familiarization 
A framework for this initial survey is the management 
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control ayetem (figure 1 ). The elemente of thie eyeteffl are 
used as the criteria in identifying problems - a problem is 
considered to be a deviation from the accepted standard. 
Types of problems are the lack of a needed control, a 
control that is not complied with, a control that is not 
cost effective, or a general lack of efficiency and effec-
tiveness in operations. A production process that includes 
no inspection of the finished product is an example of a 
missing control. 
Kropatkin, (1984, pp. 22-33>, in discussing Familiar-
ization, notes that the work done during this step can be 
crucial to the success of the audit. During this step, the 
auditor determines the purpose of the audit <compliance, 
financial attestation, internal control evaluation, opera-
tional, etc.> and the desired result of the audit work 
<i.e., a list of internal control weaknesses). This is also 
considered the time to plan the length of the engage 
ment and the personnel needed to complete the engagement. 
While Cadmus, Sawyer, and Brink and Witt treat these deci-
sions as more or less given, Thornhill and Kropatkin 
emphasize the unique nature of each audit situation and the 
need to carefully assess the goals of the audit at the 
beginning of each engagement. 
Once the auditors know what is to be accomplished, a 
schedule is set for each audit step's expected completion 
date and audit report issuance. The Director of Internal 
Audits will assess the manpower needed to complete the 
project, and will assign personnel accordingly. This 
FIGURE 1. THE MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM3 
Organizational Control 









Stated Corporate Objectives 
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Long-range Planning <Strategic 
and Operational> 
Operating Budgets 
Cost Accounting Systems 
Cost Controls 
Liquid Asset Control 
Credit and Receivable Control 
Inventory Control 








Purchasing and Procurement 
includes net only allocating appropriate man-hours, but 
assessing any particular or unusual skills or knowledge 
needed to perform the audit adequat~ly. Arrangements are 
made for work space for the auditors, if necessary. 
Another characteristic of the Familiarization step is 
the performance of background work in the audit office. 
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This would include reviewing the permanent files pertaining 
to the entity under audit. Included in these files would be 
the entity's policies and procedures, it's charter or 
statement of authority, flowcharts on the entity's proce-
dures, and prior years' working papers as well as the 
results of any previous audits. The auditors should pay 
particular attention to previous audit findings that have 
not been satisfactorily resolved. 
During this step the auditors should also gather any 
industry or segment information that would be pertinent to 
analytic review procedures or trend analysis. If the 
auditor has access to them, he or she should review docu-
ments used by the auditee as well as reports (such as cost 
variance reports) available to the auditee. Also, the 
auditor should prepare a guide for the staff auditors in 
areas that will need special attention. 
During this step, the auditor will review the entity's 
goals and objectives. It is at this time that the auditor 
asks "what could be wrong" and seeks to answer this question 
as well. This searching for problems must be tied to the 
entity's goals and objectives, and should lead to theories 
about the source of the problem which can then be tested. 
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It ia dur'ing Famili.ar-iz.ation th.at the intet"'n.al .auditot"' 
goes to the site and starts to question the auditees. 
Cadmus (1964, p. 26) states that, in Familiarization, " 
the emphasis should be on discussion and learning about what 
is being controlled." The auditor is trying to learn the 
objectives of the entity, how the entity works to accomplish 
these objectives, and how the entity determines results 
<success or failure) (Cadmus, 1964, pp. 25-26>. From asking 
what is done and how it is done, the auditor might also 
inquire "Why is this done, and why this way?" <Sawyer, 1973, 
p. 126). 
The Familiarization step is intended to delineate the 
work for the Verification step - the auditor, during 
Familiarization, should be forming an initial impression of 
the entity's strengths and weaknesses, and this impression 
will later be tested through the gathering of supporting <or 
refuting) evidence. Kropatkin (1984> advocates that the 
auditor try to put himself in the shoes of the auditee, 
continually asking how, if he were an employee, would he try 
to "beat the system." Morse (1971) encourages the identifi-
cation of key features which appear difficult to control and 
susceptible to break-down, with attention later focused on 
these key aspects. Gathering and organizing this information 
is sometimes facilitated by the use of a Record of Impres-
sions (figure 2). 
In order to identify <tentatively) these problem areas, 
the auditor asks questions of the auditees and observes 
daily operations. The auditor will also usually make a 
flowchart of the entity's operations and document flow as 
an aid to identifying control weaknesses.4 According to 
Morse, <1971, p. 43), some questions that the auditor will 
want answers to are: 
- does management use operating standards and goals? 
- is there a lack of clarity in written instructions? 
- are tne personnel capable of performing their 
assignments? 
- do responsible parties fail to accept responsibili-
ties? 
- is there duplication of effort? 
- is there improper or wasteful use of funds? 
- is the organizational structure cumbersome or 
extravagant? 
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- does wasteful or ineffective use of employees exist? 
- are there work backlo,s? 
This list is not exhaustive - for example, the Control 
Questionnaire in Figure 3 lists more specific questions 
that might be asked during an audit of a manufacturing 
entity. 
An example of Familiarization in an operational audit 
setting might go as follows: the Production Department's 
goal is to produce 5000 widgets per week. The department is 
sustaining an unusually high rejection rate. In observa-
tions and consultations, the internal auditor has noted 
indications of a high turnover rate. One reasonable theory 
is that the rejection rate is high because the workers 
are not very familiar with the operation of the machinery. 
Thus, we have a problem - too many rejections -which may be 
observations and interviews conducted during the Familiar!-
zation Stage. 
Employee Moral 
Do employees seem to have a good attitude toward 
their fellow employees, their jobs, their 
supervisors, and the company? 
Do they accept their assignments readily? 
Do they appear to support departmental and company 
goals? 
Working Habits 
Do people appear to be working at a reasonable 
tempo? 
Yes or No 
Do they appear to be conducting an excessive amount 
of personal business at work? 
Are working hours, lunch hours, and coffee breaks 
observed? 
Is supervision sympathetic toward employee com-
plaints? Is supervision willing to take appro-
priate corrective action? 
Does the manager _seem to keep the employees 
informed? 
Organization and Staffing 
Does the organization seem to be well organized to 
accomplish objectives? 
Are tasks segregated properly? 
Does work appear to flow in an orderly and eco-
nomical manner? 
Do employees appear to be working within their job 
classifications? 
Do new employees appear to be receiving sufficient. 
orientation and training? 
Supervision 
Do supervisors appear to know their Jobs, and do 
they have the respect of their employees? 
Do supervisors seem to be exercising control and 
providing direction to employees? 
FIGURE 2. RECORD OF IMPRESSIONSS 
Interface with Other Organizations 
Does the organization seem to communicate effectively 
with interfacing organizations? 
Are there any obvious conflicts? 
Does there seem to be evidence of genuine coop-
eration? 
Working Areas 
Do working areas seem to be properly laid out and 
maintained? 
Do location, noise levels, lighting, temperature, 
and house-keeping seem adequate and lend 
themselves to an effective operation? 
Does machinery and equipment seem to be properly 
maintained? 
Do employees seem to have adequate equipment? 
In the following space explain any adverse ratings. If 
specific deficiency findings appear relevant to any of the 
adverse ratings, reference them. 
FIGURE 2 (CONTINUED) 
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Adrrdnieb'.ation 
What means are used for recording employees' attendance? 
What means are used for recording employees' time charges? 
What means of monitoring are used to ensure the accuracy of 
the attendance records and time charges? 
How are attendance and labor hours balanced? ' 
What is the basis for redistributing labor charges from pool 
work orders to ultimate work orders? 
What methods are used to control payments to suppliers? 
What methods are used to safeguard assets and facilities? 
How are the entrance and exit of personnel controlled? 
How are the entrance and exit of materials controlled? 
How are valuable documents controlled? 
How is the need for repetitive reports determined? 
How are telephone and telegram expenses controlled? 
How are files kept up-to-date? 
How are insurable valuables determined? 
Production Services 
What methods are used to schedule and control the manufac-
ture of assemblies? 
How are behind-schedule conditions determined and reported? 
What assurance is provided that current, accurate planning 
documents (shop orders, tool orders, etc.) are used? 
What provision is made that the latest blueprints will be 
used? 
What are the methods used to forecast needs for component 
parts and other materials and supplies? 
What provision is made for scheduling and taking cycle 
inventories? · 
What methods are used to evaluate employee productivity? 
What provisions have been made to procure materials and 
services at the most favorable prices? 
What provisions have been made to account for and safeguard 
severable fixed assets? 
What provisions have been made for issuing, safeguarding, 
and accounting for standard tools and supplies? 
What provisions have been made to identify tools? 
How are tools inventoried? 
What provision has been made for preventive and corrective 
maintenance? 
Production 
What means are used to control vehicles and gasoline and to 
provide for appropriate maintenance? 
What provisions have been made for the detection, accumula-
tion, and disposition of scrapped and surplus materials? 
FICURE 3. CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE6 
Production, continued 
What means are used to ensure the prompt shipment of 
completed assemblies? 
What methods are used to expedite the receipt of parts and 
the reporting of parts shortages? 
What means are used to maintain parts and stock bins? 
What provision has been made to detect the excess usage of 
material? 
What are the methods employed to control high-value stock 
levels? 
Quality Contro.l 
What methods are used in the inspection of assemblies to 
assure compliance with quality standards and engineering 
drawings and specifications? 
What records of rejection are maintained? 
What are the procedures for reviewing and evaluating 
discrepant parts and materials? 
What provision has been made for the inspection of produc~ 
tion tooling? 
How are production and inspection stamps controlled? 
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What provision has been made for the certification of gau·ges 
.and equipment? 
FIGURE 3 <CONTINUED) 
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cantr'allsble by the company t per-hspe thr'augh better' tr'aining 
of new workers). The auditor's initial impression regarding 
the problem and its cause will come from the Familiarization 
step. At this stage, however, the auditor has only a theory 
that this is the problem - or, more usually, a few theories 
about possible sources of the problem. He or she will have 
to gather more substantial evidence before being convinced 
of this theory's validity. 
One final observation about the Familiarization step is 
that it resembles the evaluation of the internal control 
system that is performed prior to substantive testing in 
public audits. A primary goal at this stage is the deter-
mination of which aspects of the management control system 
can be relied upon and which cannot. The difference, 
however, is that in a public audit, an internal control 
weakness would lead to more extensive substantive testing, 
since the main goal of testing the internal control system 
is to determine whether the system will produce reliable 
evidence. In internal auditing a control weakness is an 
audit finding in itself, 'since a main goal is to evaluate 
.the effectiveness and efficiency of controls. 
Step II - Verification 
Kropatkin <1984, p. 11) defines Verification as "the 
evidential check on the.tentative conclusions reached in 
CStep I, Familiarization]." The auditor should have in mind 
a specific conclusion for which he or she needs supporting 
evidence. Once a tentative conclusion concerning a possible 
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weakness is formulated, evidence must be gathered to support 
<or refute) the conclusion. Depending on the type of audit, 
this process may be quite straightforward, following proce-
dures similar to those used in public auditing. This 
process may, in other circumstances, require a great deal of 
creativity; not only in gathering the evidence, but in 
deciding what type of evidence would provide the type of 
assurance needed in the circumstances. A danger exists 
that auditors will gather evidence and perform checks based 
on what has been done customarily or on some arbitrary list 
of available procedures. 
Although the internal auditor may not have access to a 
list of specific procedures to follow for any particular 
circumstance, the profession has developed some guidelines 
that the auditor should follow. As with public auditing, 
internal audit evidence must be "sufficient, competent, and 
relevant" <Arens and Loebbecke, 1984, Sawyer, 1973). This 
means that there must be enough data to support a particular 
conclusion, and it must be reliable. In addition, the 
evidence must provide the appropriate type of assurance to 
support the conclusion. For example, if the auditor wants 
to verify that raw materials are delivered to the assembly 
line on a timely basis, it would pot be appropriate to look 
on receiving documents at the warehouse for the date the 
materials arrived at the warehouse. Rather, the auditor 
would look at materials handling records for times the 
materials were delivered, or possibly on cost accounting 
reports for instances of work stoppages due to unavailable 
materials. 
Sawyer (1973) distinguishes four categories of evi-
dence: Physical, Documentary, Testimonial, or Analytical. 
Physical evidence is that which the auditor can see and be 
relatively sure of what he is seeing. If he sees a truck, 
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he believes that the truck exists. Physical evidence is 
usually the most compelling. However, seeing is not always 
believing. For example, few auditors would be qualified to-
look at a stone and ascertain whether it is a diamond or 
merely cut glass. In this circumstance, the auditor would 
need documentary (a certificate of authenticity) or testi-
monial (a statement from an jeweler) evidence. Either of 
these types of evidence is less convincing than physical 
evidence, simply because the auditor cannot be absolutely 
sure of the reliability of the source. 
The fourth category, Analytical, consists of reasoning, 
judgement, and logical thought. This is often the least 
convincing <though quite valid) evidence simply because of 
its lack of verifiability and objectivity. Other people, 
with different backgrounds, may not agree with the auditor's 
reasoning. Conclusions based on analysis usually require a 
greater quantity of data to support them. 
Sawyer (1973) also lists four forms of field work: 
Analysis, Verification, Investigation, and Evaluation. 
Analysis can be defined as the breaking-down of the object 
of study into its component parts in order to gain a more 
thorough understanding of its nature. Verification consists 
of comparisons between two sources of information for 
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correlations. Investigation is an inquiry that involves a 
focused approach, such as pointed questions about a parti-
cular problem. Sawyer lists Evaluation as a form of field 
work because the auditor is constantly evaluating evidence 
as it is gathered to determine if the evidence is sufficient 
and to formulate an initial impression of the results to 
which the evidence is leading. 
To Sawyer's list of general field work forms can be 
added a list of "audit tools" promulgated by various 
authors. For example, Dittenhofer (1985) lists as evidence 
confirmation, verification, and observation. Morris adds 
interviews, flowcharting, statistical sampling, regressing 
analysis, PERT techniques,- financial analysis, and linear 
programming <1978, 1981 >. These are the most widely used 
techniques, but there are others. 
Step III - Evaluation and Recommendation 
Kropatkin (1984, p. 197) characterizes Evaluation as 
determining "what was versus what should have been" and 
Cadmus (1964, p. 30) defines it as the "investigation of 
deviations and formulation of solutions." In this step, the 
auditor evaluates his tentative conclusions in the light of 
the evidence that has been gathered. The auditor is 
concerned not only with the findings themselves, but with 
their significance to the entity as a whole. 
The auditor must keep in mind that he is searching for 
deviations of reality from organizational goals and objec-
tives. Conclusions may have to be discarded or modified, or 
more evidence may have to be gathered, due to unexpected 
revelations. 
This step is characterized by a mass of information 
that must be reviewed and synthesized in order to reach a 
meaningful conclusion; In addition to having a clear idea 
of the goals and objectives of the auditee, the auditor must 
have defined and performed the correct evidence-gathering 
procedures. Little hope remains for accomplishing the audit 
objectives if the auditor finds himself at the Evaluation 
and Recommendation step lacking the appropriate evidential 
matter to support his tentative conclusions formed during 
the Familiarization phase. 
During this step, the auditor also will identify 
possible solutions to problems. This activity generally 
requires creative thinking by, and cooperation of, the 
auditee. The auditor must sit down with the auditee and 
other interested organizational members and discuss various 
alternative actions. A break-down in communications and/or 
coordination at this point can mean a real lack of effec-
tiveness in identifying and implementing solutions. 
As an example ot the Evaluation and Recommendation 
step, consider the situation introduced earlier where the 
company was experiencing an unacceptable rejection rate in 
production. The auditor tentatively concluded that the 
auditee's problem stemmed from workers' lack of familiarity 
with the production machines, due to a high rate of employee 
turnover. Upon closer inspection and gathering of evidence, 
the auditors conclude that this poor training stems from the 
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company's lack of a specific training program - managet~s in 
each area are expected to teach the employee what he or she 
needs to know in order to perform the job. No uniform 
standards exist regarding training in specific skills for a 
particular job and, during busy periods, the managers may 
give the employee only perfunctory instructions, expecting 
the employee to pick up further knowledge on the job. 
The auditor, together with the representatives from 
Personnel, Finance, Top Management, and the auditee, develop 
possible solutions to this problem. One solution could be 
to replace all of the existing managers with new managers. 
Another solution might be to develop a formal training 
program for all new employees, utilizing more of a class-
room-type approach. Another alternative might be to adopt a 
''buddy" system, whereby each new employee receives basic 
instructions and orientation from the manager, and then is 
assigned to an experienced employee for more detailed 
instructions and consultations when the new employee 
encounters a problem or has a question. 
The first solution (dismissing the current managers> 
would not be very palatable to the current managers Cor the 
auditor). The second alternative seems workable, but would 
require a rather large expenditure to initiate. Together, 
the auditor and auditee determine that the third alternative 
<the "buddy" system) is the most feasible at the present 
time. 
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Step IV - Reporting 
Cadmus has defined reporting as "the formal communi-
cation of significant results" (1964, p. 30). Two important 
ideas in this definition are ''formaP' and "significant." As 
was mentioned in connection with Evaluation and Recom-
mendation, the auditor usually will discuss findings with 
the auditee before the report is issued. Thus, the problem 
can often be resolved immediately, and upper-level manage-
ment need only be informed that the problem exists and that 
a solution is being implemented. An exception to this, of 
course, is when the auditee fails to acknowledge that a 
problem exists or to take corrective action. 
The auditor will only include significant findings in 
the formal report. During any audit, the auditor is likely 
to find a variety of minor problems that need to be correc-
ted. ·Often, the situation is only a matter of informing 
employees as to the correct procedure to be followed, or 
helping an employee to learn the correct way to deal with a 
particularly complex procedure. These sorts of situations 
can usually be dealt with as the audit proceeds, and need 
not be specifically brought to the attention of upper-level 
management. 
. 
Generally, an Operational Audit Report is unlike a 
public audit report. Rather than expressing an opinion as 
to the fairness of presentation of Financial Accounting 
information, the auditor is attempting to identify opera-
tional areas that need coordinated managerial attention and 
action. The Operational Audit Report is usually very 
detailed, including a discussion of the objectives of the 
audit, the problems identified, and possible corrective 
actions. If an action has been implemented, or a specific 
alternative is considered preferable, this too would be 
included in the audit report. 
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Once the audit report is issued, the auditor's job is 
almost done. The final task is to follow up on findings to 
determine whether corrective action was indeed taken and 
whether these actions have had the desired <and expected) 
results. 
Conclusion 
The basic audit methodology outlined in this chapter is 
very similar to that used in public auditing to evaluate the 
system of internal control. Two differences ~etween public 
auditing and internal auditing exist: control objectives in 
an internal audit may not be predefined, and in the case of 
an operational audit the audit extends beyond an evaluation 
of the effectiveness of controls to the identification of 
possible solutions to control problems. 
Not only is the basic methodology very similar to that 
used in public auditing, but the ~echniques (such as 
flowcharting, control questionnaires, looking at documents) 
are taken from that field. While the extant methodology and 
techniques serve internal auditing well up to a point, 
within the realm of operational auditing additional method-
ologies and techniques may be needed to ensure that the 
oper~tion~l ~uditor meete the preecribed go~le ~nd objec= 
tives. The next chapter discusses these goals and objec-




1. While Sawyer characterizes the departmental perspective 
as organizational and the inter-departmental perspective as 
functional, the bulk of the sources cited in this work use 
the designations given in the text. 
2. Kropatkin's thirty-nine steps are: 
1. Identify the precise nature of the project 
and the desired end product. 
2. Obtain related audit reports, permanent 
files, previous work~ng papers, tax returns 
and similar historical information. Follow 
up on recommendations for action from the 
previous audit. 
3. Get industry analyses of the auditee for 
similar or related entities. 
4. Establish tentative time parameters for the 
assignment. 
5. Determine required staff resources. 
6. Entrance conference with the auditee. 
Establish mutually agreed-upon audit objec-
tives. 
7. Request inltial working data for preliminary 
study. 
8. Reserve adequate staff working space and 
secure commitments for computer time and 
secretarial and duplicating services. 
9. Prepare a survey guide as a broad-based 
working road map for the staff auditors to 
follow. . 
10. Physically inspect the entire organization 
and facilities. 
11. Compare observations of physical items to the 
paper records of the organization. 
12. Determine whether all the processes and 
functions logically relate to the physical 
aspect previously observed. 
13. Prepare flow charts for process and organiza-
tional understanding. 
14. Pay strict attention to cash. 
15. Scrutinize all accounts, looking for unusual 
trends or items. 
16. Consider plant operations. 
17. Consider the keepers of the books. 
18. Check any union arrangements. 
19. Ask "What could be wrong?" 
20. Take appropriate samples. 
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~·1 • Detet"'mine what is being tested bef'ot"'e taking 
any sample. 
22. Decide why the object of the testing is being 
tested. 
23. Decide precisely what would constitute an 
error. 
24. Consider what will be done with the test 
results. 
25. Know the difference between statistical 
sampling and judgement samples and how and 
when each can be used effectively. 
26. Three main averages: a. Measures of disper-
sion, b. normal distribution, c. probability 
distribution. 
27. Consider how dispersion should be mathemati-
cally calculated and used to measure the 
reliability of an average. 
28. Consider the use of computer cross-matching 
for a 100 percent sweep of any automated 
data. 
29. Stay on top of training needs - Sampling 
techniques: Unrestricted samples, stratified 
samples, cluster samples, acceptance samples, 
discovery samples, internal samples, dollar 
unit samples. 
30. Don't audit around the computer. 
31. Check computer security. 
32. Know how to use computer matches to assist in 
uncovering abnormal or incorrect postings or 
entries in any combined, comparative, or 
interlocking set of records. 
33. Don't be overwhelmed by cost accounting 
assignments. 
34. Stay alert to the possibilities for fraud and 
abuse. 
35. Sharpen your reporting skills. 
36. Make recommendations fit the report and the 
reader. 
37. Keep in touch with personnel (auditees) about 
findings as you proceed - no surprises at 
report time. 
38. Make sure you get replies that are responsive 
to the matters recommended or reported. 
39. Have an explanatory exit conference. 
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3. John C. Burton, "Management Auditing," The Journal of 
Accountancy 125:5 <May, 1968>, p. 42. 
4. Flowcharts, the Record of Impressions, and Control 
Questionnaires are only a few of the workpapers used by 
Internal Auditors. For more examples, see Sawyer (1973), 
Thornhill (1985), and Appendixes C and D of Brink and Witt 
( 1982). 
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5. Sawyer, Mod>=-rn Internal Auditing. Altamonte Springs, 
FL: The Institute of Internal Auditors, Inc., 1981, p.111. 
6. Sawyer, 1981, p. 116. 
CHAPTER II 
INTERNAL AUDITING GOALS, OBJECTIVES 
AND METHODOLOGICAL 
INSUFFICIENCIES 
Operational Auditing Goals and Objectives 
Although the control issues discussed in the previous 
chapter form the basis of both Financial and Operational 
Auditing, the goals of each form of auditing are not identi-
cal. Fi~ancial Auditing is concerned with examining and 
evaluating Financial Accounting controls with the goal of 
ensuring that the accounting system produces reliable 
Financial Statements. In regards to systems, the focus is 
on the Financial Accounting Information System. For evalu-
ating controls in this system, the methodology of public 
auditing is eminently suitable and has been proven effec-
tive. 
Operational Auditing objectives, however, are concerned 
with the "Three E 's'' (Effie lency, Economy, and Effect! ve-
.. 
ness) of the entire organization <Morse, 1971; Nich, et al., 
1987). Operational Auditing goals are not only concerned 
with whether controls are appropriate and effective, but 
also whether goals and objectives are being achieved, 
(either because or in spite of the state of the control 
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system). The auditor's concern with the efficiency, econ-
omy, and effectiveness of operations is a different emphasis 
than that of assessing system reliability. 
Historical Development of Operational Auditing 
In reference to Operational Auditing, Brown (1987) has 
noted that 
Operational Audits are varied and diverse in 
nature. Specific 'cookbook' audit programs are 
seldom satisfactory guides to planning and 
performing the engagement. This is because they 
may not take into consideration unique charac-
teristics or peculiarities which exist and thus 
may omit areas which require investigation. <p. 
45) 
For over ten years, internal auditors have been cogni-
zant of the fact that Financial (external) Auditing method-
ology is not sufficient to achieve the goals of Operational 
Auditing. The Honorable Jean-Pierre Goyer (1976) noted that 
We have to find ways to audit effectiveness--an 
soon ..• we are incurring unproductive coste because 
of the duplication and overlapping in our audit 
efforts. In many cases, also, these efforts are 
dissipated because audit reports are not tailored 
to meet the needs of the recipient and thus are 
not fully effective. (p. 43) 
Goyer considered one of the causes of this lack of audit 
effectiveness to be "an increasing lack of audit techniques" 
. 
appropriate to the evaluation of operations and organiza-
tional goal attainment (1976, p. 44). He further states 
that "new and reliable methods must be found to facilitate 
the fulfillment of new audit re~uirements for such activi-
ties as evaluation of an organizations's results and how 
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well t.he ope:u'atlone wer·e adminietet"'ed" ( ·1976 ~ p. 45). 
Numerous prescriptions to the methodology problem have 
been proposed, but most of them have centered on techniques 
to be used in the various stages of the audit, such as 
Familiarization techniques or evidence gathering techniques 
for use in the Verification step.1 Maguire (1978) advocated 
integrating Industrial Engineering principles into the 
design of Operational Auditing. checklists. Accordingly, 
this integration would include three main aspects: 
analysis, measurement, and improvement of the 
methods of performing tasks assigned to 
workers; 
design and installation of better systems of 
integrating duties assigned to a group; 
specification, prediction, and evaluation of 
the results obtained in operations. 
Johnstone (1978) was one of the first authors to pro-
pose a systems viewpoint in Operational Auditing. While 
Johnstone proposed "an evaluation of.what would be the most 
satisfactory system from a purely theoretical viewpoint" (p. 
26), he did not give advice on how to operationalize this 
evaluation. Later that same year, Henderson and Hernandez 
(1979) suggested focusing on the management information 
system and the decision process. The decision process 
consists of formulating alternatives, evaluating alterna-
tives, and choosing an alternative. They proposed that 
internal auditors could examine the information system 
inputs into the decision process, the methodology for 
formulating alternatives, and the analytical technique used 
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to guide choice of alternatives. ihis framework, which 
could be useful in examing the strategic management of an 
organization, does not seem to have been widely adopted yet. 
Warfield (1979> proposed an "Audit Program for Organ-
izational Control and Effectiveness" that centers on the 
factors of Organizational Objectives and Responsibilities, 
Organizational Structure, Decision Making, Performance 
Evaluation, Communication, and Organizational Change. 
Warfield's program was one of the first to consider the 
social element in organizations, and some of these concepts 
have been adopted in Internal Auditing. However, like many 
of the proposed "revolutionary" methodologies, Warfield's 
approach is basically one of extended questionnaires, with 
l~ttle or no provision for integration of evidence gathered. 
Crockett (1980) noted that work done during the Famili-
arization stage should enable auditors to identify ••problem 
areas, sensitive areas, and operations that are crucial to 
the success of the auditee•• <p. 69>. Generally, Crockett's 
discussion is a flowchart model of the Operational Audit 
process, and the most notable characteristic of his discus-
sion is the above quoted identification of critical opera-
tions. Crockett notes that '"these should emerge as auditors 
review the output of control systems, discuss operations 
with line management, and observe operations with an exper-
ienced eye. ihere are numerous Operational Auditing ques-
tionnaires available to.guide auditors in this phase" (p. 
69). So again, although Crockett points out an important 
<and needed) shift in emphasis, he does not necessarily 
propose a new methodology. 
A radical departure from extant methodology appeared 
late in 1980 as "The Process Control Approach CPCAJ to 
Internal Auditing" proposed by Paul. PCA is a methodology 
which "enables the auditor to link error occurrence with 
error detection and ... to monitor the system of internal 
control" Cp. 34). The PCA is a fairly sophisticated 
statistical approach that allows the auditor to determine 
whether a system is in- or out-of-control, and may allow 
identification of the cause of an out-of-control s~tuation. 
It is based on the statistical premise that variations in 
data are either random or systematic, and use of the ap-
proach requires ·some degree of sophistication in the use of 
statistical tools and enough historical data to compute base 
statistics. A computer would probably be necessary, in 
order that the calculations not become too tedious or time-
consuming. The PCA appears to only be applicable to systems 
variables that can be quantitatively described, but when. 
used in appropriate situations it seems very useful. While 
the validity of these concepts is generally acknowledged in 
Operational Auditing literature, application of this method-
ology may be limited, particularly by a lack of technical 
sophistication on the part of som~ Internal Audit staffs, 
and a lack of computer tools to assist the auditor in such 
analysis. The availability of increasingly sophisticated 
software for microcomputers can be expect.ed t.o alleviate the 
second condition to a great extent. 
In 1982, Binns proposed the design of Standard Opera-
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ting Procedures (SOP> questionnaires based on a SOP manual. 
The SOP questionnaire is an enhanced version of the tradi-
tional compliance questionnaire. Its primary advantage is 
that it relates compliance questions directly to compliance 
obJectives, usually by reference to the compliance standard 
in each que_stion or group of questions. Binns notes that 
the SOP questionnaire does not always answer the question of 
why a particular policy is not complied with or why a policy 
has been adopted in the first place. 
In contrast to the compliance approach, Hyde (1982) 
Joined Johnstone and Paul in advocating the adoption of 
principles from systems engineering and scientific methods. 
However, Hyde presents at best a cursory inspection of these 
principles and methods. 
An outstanding development in 1985 is the "Operational 
Audit Risk-and-Technique Matrix'' proposed by Flesher. The 
Risk-and-Technique Matrix is a "means of relating a depart-
ment's or function's operating obJectives and management. 
techniques to the various risks involved" (p. 45). The 
matrix is constructed as_ in Figure 4. The first column 
consists of goals or objectives of the organization. The 
second column contains risks that could contribute to not 
achieving the goals in Column 1. ~ This column could possibly 
contain opportunities as well, although Flesher does not 
discuss the possibility. Column 3 contains management 
techniques (controls) that will alleviate or prevent the 
risks, and Column 4 contains Operational Auditing procedures 
that should be employed to determine whether the management 











techniquee are being followed. The matrix, if ueed proper= 
ly, can be both a guideline for developing audit tests and a 
tool for analysis of audit findings. The Risk-and-Technique 
Matrix could also be an effective tool for auditors trying 
to analyze the social system of the organization, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Finally, Brown's <1987) solution to the lack of 
satisfactory audit guides was to propose the Commonsense 
Approach to Operational Auditing <CAA). The CAA approach 
starts with the objectives of internal controls, and is very 
similar to the general process outlined in Chapter I. Brown 
specifically notes that relating specific prescribed con-
trols to the control objectives will result in a more thor-
ough audit. His second step is to."obtain a familiarity 
with and working knowledge of the audit area•• ( p. 47 >. The 
principal goal in this stage is risk assessment, yet while 
he discusses the traditional familiarization tools (inter-
views and observations, discussions with management, reading 
prior audit reports), he does not discuss the control 
objectives and specific control identification of his first 
step. Thus, Brown does not present an integrated system for 
linking control objectives, specific controls, evaluation of 
those controls (and missing controls) and conclusions. 
Flesher seems to have done a much better job of accomplish-
ing these objectives. 
The various approaches and methods discussed above are 
representative of the trends in Operational Auditing during 
the last decade. Many of the concepts have been integrated 
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int.o Int.er~nal Audit.ing to some degree (some fully, most. 
partially or only on a very limited basis). Even as these 
techniques were being proposed, however, internal auditors 
were aware that continued effort was. needed to identify a 
useful methodology <M~rris., 1978) and that a fundamental 
shift in orientation was. needed to effectively use the new 
techniques.. While internal auditors have made some progress 
in adopting new methods, Hyde (1980) states that Internal 
Auditing's base "is still solidly in financial operations" 
<p. 66). Hodges notes that, "the traditional audit approach 
emphasizes evaluation of past performance'' (1978, p. 53) and 
Baggett (1982) is even more critical, stating 
internal auditors tend to be oriented toward 
ascertaining the existen6e of records and testing 
their accuracy ••. The logical consequence of this 
is operational audits that concentrate on a review 
of detailed records and procedures. Typical of 
this, Operational Auditing guides list specific 
functions. For each function, a 'best• or typical 
set of procedures is prescribed. The auditor is 
expected to find or recommend these procedures <p. 
44). 
Mort~is.' ( 1981 ) comments on. the reporting stage are similar~ 
to Hodges' and Baggett's: 
Internal auditors have been led to believe that in 
order to upgrade their image and the professional 
status of their audits, modern tools should be 
applied. They lose sight of the fact that these 
CsicJ tools are only as goo~ as their interpreta-
tion and, thus, are no more than what they make of 
them. Professional internal auditing requires 
more than the mere application of audit tech-
niques, it requires the sound interpretation of 
the facts and figures of the findings into terms 
audiences - management and the audit committee -
can understand and use. (p. 52) 
Continuing along these lines, a 1984 study by Mautz, 
47 
Tieeeen, and Coleon found, in a eurvey of thoee who work 
with internal auditors, that two reasons why Internal 
Auditing has not achieved its full potential are "lack of 
managerial perspective on the part of internal auditors" and 
"narrow point of view of internal auditors" (p. 38). The 
latter is also related to methodology - the transactional 
orientation traditionally followed simply leads to inappro-
priate or insufficient methodologies in the Operational 
Auditing setting. Mautz, et al., conclude that the two 
areas <Financial and Operational) are "substantively differ-
ent" (p. 41) and that different techniques are appropriate. 
Nich, Gift, and Zeb <1987) discussed the state of the 
art and the future of Internal Auditing. They concluded 
that Internal Auditing has been playing a reactive role, and 
that attempts at role shifting have not been successful 
because ''internal auditors are neither organizationally 
positioned nor particularly competent to play a broade·r 
role" (p. 4). They also felt that the idea encompassed 
within Operational Auditing, to audit for effectiveness, 
efficiency, and economy <the three E's), was basically sound 
but that Internal Auditing was "not perceived by senior 
management as particularly competent to do an effective job 
of judging Cthe three E'sJ within a larger organizational 
context" (p. 5). Again, this lack of competence was due to 
an emphasis on transactions and inadequate methods. They 
note that both management and much of the Internal Auditing 
profession see Internal Auditing "as primarily an accounting 
function, employing essentially the methods of the public 
accountant." More specifically, Fletcher and Verechocr 
(1984) note that 
Auditors seldom addressed the question of whether 
or how effectively the manager had achieved the 
goals or primary performance objectives of the 
unit because it was usually very difficult to 
measure with precision the degree of importance 
management functions had played in that success or 
failure (pp. 29-30). 
In addition, Dittenhofer (1985) states, in regards to gov-
ernmental auditing, that 
Internal auditors perform some efficiency type 
audits and few effectiveness audits. These audits 
are often not performed because of ... Ca1 lack of 
knowledge about the methodology for performing 
this type of auditing (p. 55>. 
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In light of the conclusions of other authors cited above, it 
seems reasonable to generalize Dittenhofer's comments to 
operational auditors in the private sector as well. 
The dissatisfaction with extant methodology persists 
even to the present time. One result of the lack of appro-
priate methods is the tendency of inte~nal auditors to 
consistently reinvent an Operational Audit approach for each 
different audit scenario <Goyer, 1976). This tendency is 
apparent in the appearance of numerous .. how to" articles 
appearing in Internal Auditing journals lately. Nich, et 
al, (1987) analyzed three 1986 issues of The Internal 
Auditor and found 50% of the articles concerned with prac-
tice, or .. how to,•• (p. 6) and another 23% with information 
systems auditing. They concluded that internal auditors are 
overwhelmingly concerned with transactions, and that ''larger 
issues, such ae results, function, and human relations get 
scant attention .. (p. 7). This analysis was extended to 
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include eleven issues of The Internal Auditor including all 
of 1986 and the first four issues of 1987 <through October>, 
with somewhat different results (see Figure 5). In this 
analysis, 40% of the articles dealt with either methods 
(practice) or defining controls. Another 24% were concerned 
with Internal Auditing's organizational role or function. 
While these results support the conclusions of Nich, et al., 
they also lead to the conclusion that internal auditors may 
be having trouble using the basic methodologies already 
available to them: the articles dealing with methods were, 
for example, "An Effective Approach to EDP Auditing," 
<February 1986>, ''Improving Audits of Government Contracts," 
<August 1986>, and "Practical Audit Risk Arialysis" <August 
1987). 
Part of the problem in the search for appropriate 
methodologies for Operational Auditing seems to lie with its 
different goal set (from that of Financial Auditing). This 
different goal set may not be served adequately by method-
ology adopted almost intact from public auditing. Indeed, 
Nich, et. al., would like to see Internal Auditing branch 
out and adopt methodologies from different fields. 
One of the disciplines from which Nich, et al. propose 
adopting methodologies is Informa:tlon Systems Design. This 
is not a new proposal, having been promulgated at least as 
early as 1976.2 Persuading internal auditors to adopt a 
systems methodology is not without its problems, however. 
Marvin (1977> points out that while a systems model is a 
powerful tool, internal auditors may not embrace systems 
FIGURE 5. ANALYSIS OF ARTICLES IN THE 
INTERNAL AUDITOR <JANUARY 1986 
THROUGH OCTOBER 1987> 







Other <Prof. Stds., 




















methodology completely because they realize that ''they may 
lose some of their independence by getting involved in 
recommendations about how to better achieve the objectives 
of programs." Marvin explains that this realization stems 
from the knowledge of the differing backgrounds of internal 
auditors and systems analysts. Systems analysts tradi-
tionally are involved in the decision-making process and 
have a more direct influence on management behavior. The 
internal auditor who wishes to possess syst~ns analysis 
skills may be expected to incorporate into his or her world 
view a similar expectation of direct involvement in the 
decision making process, and yet in the Financial Auditing 
realm internal auditors have always been prohibited from 
performing management functions in order to maintain their 
independence and objectivity. Marvin's proposed solution to 
this dilemma is that internal auditors utilize technical 
assistance staffs of specialists. However, it seems that 
such specialists are being integrated into the Internal 
Audit staff <Fritzemeyer, 1976> and especially within the 
realm of Operational Auditing a more active involvement in 
the decision-making process is inevitable. 
In 1977, Knighton proposed a systems approach based on 
evaluating information inputs into the decision-making pro-
cess and "identifying and evaluating each policy, procedure, 
or other element of operational control designed to promote 
improved performance of the tasks required" (p. 44>. 
Knighton did not propose exclusive use of the systems app-
roach, but rather included it in a list of appropriate 
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methodologiee euch ae the walk=through audit~ flowcharting~ 
and the program audit. Ridel (1982), alternatively, advo-
cates the systems approach and notes that consideration of 
the methodology should reveal that the omission of any 
aspect of his approach would result in a less-than-compre-
hensive audit. He notes that the systems approach is a 
reaction to increasing complexity in the environment and 
that auditors can no longer ''examine each function or 
activity on our audit schedules as an independent entity 
because functions are not independent" (p. 24). Ridel also 
states that most of the concepts of the systems approach are 
incorporated in Sawyer's The Practice of Modern Internal 
Auditing, but that Sawyer did not present an "organized 
attempt to define and analyze a function and recognize the 
environment in which-this function operates" <p. 25). Ridel 
proposes five criteria with which to define the function 
being audited: 
the system objectives and performance 
measurements; 
the system environment and fixed con-
straints; 
the resources of the system; 
the elements or organization of the 
system; 
the management or control of the system. 
His discussion of these criteria primarily encompasses the 
Familiarization stage, with some explanation of the other 
stages and how the information gathered during Familiariza-
tion will influence the subsequent audit work. Ridel does 
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not propose a particular systems methodology. 
In 1987, Miller did propose a particular systems 
methodology - a Socio-Technical approach. The basic premise 
of the Socio-Technical Systems Analysis <STSA> approach is 
that not only policies, structure, controls and tasks are 
important, but that the ""people'' or social system "s func-
tioning is "'critical to the organization's performance"' < p. 
96). Miller notes that traditional Internal Auditing is 
concerned only with the technical system (policies, proce-
dures, controls, tasks, etc.) and that STSA will not only 
involve auditors with the social system but will also enable 
them to ""improve the quality of work life for employees"" <p. 
96). These concepts, fundamental to STSA, will be discussed 
in more depth in the next chapter. 
Miller's discussion extends primarily to the planning 
phase of Operational Audit administration - deciding which 
audits are to be performed over some planning horizon. He 
notes that during planning both social and technical factors 
must be considered. The technical factors Miller lists are 
internal controls, organizational structure, technology and 
. 
tools, management information systems, the physical environ-
ment, and work process or flow. He lists sociological fac-
tors as team effectiveness, interpersonal relations, com-
munications, intergroup relations, organizational climate, 
and employee development. The technical factors seem to 
have dominated most of the Internal Auditing literature in 
the last decade. Miller notes that in order to truly be 
involved with the social system, the plans made using STSA 
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muet be implemented using a Socio=Technical audit method= 
ology, and that such a methodology ""is far more powerful 
than the traditional financial and/or operational approa-
ches" <p. 100). Miller does not, however, discuss how to 
implement a STSA methodology in an actual audit. This paper 
will attempt to do so. 
Conclusion 
Operational Auditing has different goals than tradi-
tional Financial Auditing <either external or internal). 
Methodologies adopted primarily from Financial Auditing, and 
in particular public <external> auditing, are not sufficient 
for the needs of Operational Auditing. Many solutions to 
the methodological insufficiency created by adopting 
Financial Auditing methods have been proposed, but a new 
paradigm has yet to emerge. One particularly promising 
development is the proposed adoption of systems analysis/de-
velopment methodology by internal auditors. An inexhorable 
trend toward incorporating systems methodology has culmi-
nated in the proposal~ by Miller, that internal auditors 
adopt Socio-Technical Systems Analysis as an appropriate 
methodology. However, Miller did not operationalize the 
STSA approach for the Operational Audit scenario. 
The next chapter ~ill discuss the applicability of 
Socio-Technical Systems Analysis <STSA) Internal Auditing. 
The chapter will discuss the theoretical basis of STSA, how 
STSA can help meet the goals and objectives of Operational 
Auditing, and some benefits of STSA not fully recognized yet 
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in the Internal Auditing literature. 
ENDNOTES 
1. See for example John 0. Davies, ''Vital Questions You Need 
to Ask'', The Internal Auditor, June, 1987, pp. 54-58, which deals 
with the entire audit but concentrates on questionnaires as a 
data collection device; Spencer E. Hodges, ''A 'Listening' 
Approach to Operational Auditing", The Internal Auditor, Decem-
ber, 1978, pp. 53-55, which treats interviewing as an evidence 
gathering technique; Norman Morris, "How Does Your Audit Depart-
ment Rate?,'' The Internal Auditor, October, 1978, p. 77, for a 
list of "tools and techniques of auditing"; and Fletcher and 
Verschoor, "Managing Innovation: The Internal Auditor's Chal-
lenge," The Internal Auditor, August, 1984, pp. 29-32, for a 
discussion of CERT (control evaluation review technique>, a 
methodology for evaluating a control system, primarily through 
the use of ratios. 
2. See, for example, Fritzmeyer, "Should Internal Auditing be 
Performed by a Staff of Generalists or by a Specialized Staff?" 
The Internal Auditor, August, 1976, pp. 41-47; George and Palmer, 
"Systems Auditability and Control," The Internal Auditor, April 
1977, pp. 11-15; and Harmeyer, "Acceptance Demands Credibility," 
The Internal Auditor, October, 1978, pp. 35-52. 
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CHAPTER III 
SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
THEORY AND JUSTIFICATION 
Introduction 
The previous chapter culminated in Miller's (1987) 
proposal that Socio-Technical Systems Analysis <STSA) is an 
appropriate methodology for Operational Auditing <OA>. How-
ever, he presented little theoretical support for this conc-
lusion. What Miller must have known, but did not explicitly 
state, is that the development of STSA is a reaction to: <1) 
the Scientific Management based organizational design per-
spectives prevalent in many business applications today, and 
(2) to the increasing turbulence of the internal and exter-
nal environments in which businesses must operate. This 
chapter discusses each of these factors and how they relate 
to OA. Then, problems previously identified in Organiza-
tional Design (OD>, Management Information Systems <MIS>, 
and Management Accounting Systems <MAS) which result from 
these two factors will be discussed and related to extant OA 
problems. There is growing support for STSA on these higher 
organizational levels of control as an acceptable method-
ology to solve problems arising from both the implicit reli-
ance on the Scientific Management paradigm in newly emerging 
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or·ganizational designs, and fr•om thei:t'' intet ... ac:ti vely de= 
signed environments. This leads to the belief that STSA 
could be adopted in OA with good results. 
Scientific Management Paradigm 
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A paradigm is a world view, and one of the most perva-
sive paradigms in business, since early in the Twentieth 
Century, has been Scientific Management. This world view is 
based upon a Closed Cybernetic Systems model, though, lea-
ding to perceptions of closed systems (with little depart-
mental interdependence recognized either within the organi-
zation or with the external environment) and the need for a 
Theory X management styles· (Thomas, 1985). According to 
Thomas, "Frederick Taylor saw control as the central idea of 
Scientific Management, and cost accounting systems as cru-
cial to the achievement of this scientific control theory" 
( 1985' p. 47). 
Operational Auditing is also a crucial element of 
scientific control theory because it is a control function 
which examines and evaluates other controls (Thornhill, 
1981 ). As stated in Chapter 1, Brink <1982> notes that 
"internal auditors who do their jobs effectively become 
experts in what makes for the best possible design and 
implementation of all types of control" (p.4). Three basic 
issues in OA are whether controls have been devised and 
implemented that will help management attain the organi-
zation's goals and objectives, whether these controls are 
complied with. and assessing and improving performance 
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quality. A problem in OA is considered to be a deviation 
from the accepted standard. Types of problems are the lack 
of a needed control, a control that is not complied with, a 
control that is not cost effective, or a general lack of 
efficiency and effectiveness in operations. 
Operational auditors are overwhelmingly concerned with 
controls within the parameters defined by Scientific Manage-
. 
ment. The propensity to break tasks down into their 
smallest component tasks, coupled with a Division-of-Labor 
philosophy, leads to a focus on Financial Accounting con-
trols and to the use of methods designed for auditing those 
controls. However, as has been previously noted, Financial 
Auditing goals and Operational Auditing goals are not always 
equal. The use of primarily Financial Accounting oriented 
checklists will thus not enable operational auditors to 
accomplish their goals. 
Furthermore, the closed systems perspective leads to a 
failure to recognize interdependencies between various or-
ganizational subsystems. Coupled with the lack of system-
atic procedures to identify critical boundary conditions, 
this leads to an inability to achieve global productivity 
improvements, especially in modern designed production 
environments <such as those utili2ing CAM and JIT).1 This 
internal interdependence and global suboptimization is a 
form of Environmental Turbulence. The following sections 
discuss how the Scientific Management perspective merely 
compounds the problems created by the turbulent environment. 
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The Turbulent Environment 
The idea of a turbulent environment can be summed up in 
one idea from Elton Mayo <Bell, 1956): "The characteristic 
fact about the modern scene is the presence of constant, 
disruptive change" (p. 24). Trist <1980) notes that the 
turbulent environment is characterized by ''large competing 
organizations, all acting independently, in many diverse 
directions, CtoJ produce unanticipated and dissonant conse-
quences in the overall environment which they share" (p. 
117). In such an environment, experience is no longer the 
only important factor, because situations change so rapidly 
that experiences are not directly applicable to current 
situations <Ackoff, 1972). 
This view is inconsistent with the concept of continu-
ity long relied upon by financial (external) auditors as 
illustrated in Mautz and Sharaf's (1986) "Sixth Postulate of 
Auditing." "In the absence of clear evidence to the con-
trary, what has held true in the past for the enterprise 
under examination will hold true in the future" <p. 42). If 
operational auditors also rely upon this postulate ~and it 
seems that they do) then the implications of turbulence in 
the organization are not being incorporated into OA method-
ology.2 Furthermore, environmental influences can cause 
changes within the organization. Odiorne (1980) states 
Internal audits looks back at wbat has already 
taken place and is more often an agent of review 
than an agent of change, yet the major problem of 
accounting as a profession and of managing organi-
zations in general is to learn to cope with 
change ..• Good program audits should seek out areas 
where people are overly enmeshed in day-to-day 
internal business and, accordingly, are too 
lenient in attending to those changes ln the 
outside world which may be threats to the organi-
zation. (p. 60> 
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Odiorne's solution to the turbulence problem is better 
planning for the future, including an assessment of the 
organization's strengths and weaknesses. In support of 
Odiorne, Trist (1980) notes that the proper response to a 
turbulent environment is an interactive planning mode where 
parties cooperate to make the future happen. This interac-
tive planning mode can be quite difficult to accomplish, 
however, because employees may not possess the necessary 
skills to respond to environmental threats and opportuni-
ties. According to Ashby's "Law df Requisite Variety" 
<Trist, 1980), .. when a system's response repertoire cannot 
match increases in variety emanating from the environment, 
that system's survival is en~angered" (p. 115). Inflexible, 
bureaucratic systems fostered under the Scientific Manage-
ment paradigm fail to recognize this need, leading to incom-
plete job designs and insufficient training resulting in 
role occupants lacking a requisite variety of responses. 
More specifically, recent factors to which the social 
system must respond have been identified by Davis (1980, pp. 
9-11 ) : 
the .. school socialization process .. : people 
experience a longer period during which the 
individual is most important; 
depression era workers are leaving the 
workforce, which results in a workforce 
composed of individuals who do not remember 
worrying about starvation; 
= welfare lowers the cost of refusing to work; 
economic opportunity laws place the burden of 
social change on the work organizations; 
the increasing rate of technological change 
causes environmental turbulence through the 
technical subsystem; 
the changing role of management control: 
employees exercise more judgement and discre-
tion, management may have to trust employees 
to perform tasks about which management knows 
very little. 
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Brink and Witt (1982) recognize this turbulence, noting 
that "CtheseJ environmental forces are a part. of the genet~-
ally accelerated rate of social expectations in such areas 
as protection of natural resources, pollution, minority 
groups, higher levels or business responsibility, and moral 
standards"" < p. 7). Glenn <1977) also seems to recognize 
turbulence in his comment th~t •• Internal auditors should be 
looking at what is happening today and endeavoring to 
determine and report its likely effect in the future so that 
management can take action before the event and thus avoid 
unnecessary expense and loss'" (p. 19). Finally, Thornhill 
<1981) lists four factors that create a riskier <more turbu-
lent) environment in which operational auditors must cur-
rently operate: business and government continue to grow 
bigger and more complex; products and services are more 
diverse and complex than ever; underdeveloped countries are 
becoming more industrialized and developed countries are 
becoming more technologically advanced and information 
oriented; and erosion of ethical standards - respect for 
authority, managerial competence, honesty, and reliability 
(pp. 28-29). Thornhill's solution includes better reporting 
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and controls for operations, reduction of risks, and better 
controls to prevent fraud. More importantly, he also advo-
cates better communications with managers and a more active 
<rather than reactive) role in organizational policy 
setting. 
Organizational Design 
Davis <1971) identified four organizational require-
ments for improved performance, cooperation, and commitment 
in the face of turbulent environments: individual and group 
autonomy in planning and controlling their tasks; ability to 
adapt to, and learn from, the environment; a requisite vari-
ety of responses <Ashby'sLaw of Requisite Variety); and the 
individual's or group's ability to participate in the devel-
opment of jobs, roles, an·d the planning of changes. Rather 
than providing these requirements, Scientific Management 
results in fractionalization of processes into "simple, 
routine" jobs leading to employee dissatisfaction, absentee-
ism, turnover, and difficulties in managing employees 
<Thomas, 1985). These are some of the problems OA seeks to 
solve, yet it seeks to do so by imposing more controls, more 
"separation of duties" <task fractionalization>, and by 
discouraging employee discretion. Within the Scientific 
Managemente paradigm, OA cannot adequately address these 
problems because they are a product of the paradigm. 
Management Information Systems Design 
The problems created by the Scientific Management para-
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Information Systems (MIS) designed for organizations. Thomas 
<1985) states 
As environmental turbulence increases, tradition-
ally designed organizations have had limited 
success in adapting due to structural rigidities 
and lack of employee motivation. Similar problems 
exist with the MIS; an inability to adapt informa-
tion systems to changing organizational needs, and 
a lack of user motivations to accept, maintain, 
and improve them (p. 21 ). 
In terms of OA, MIS designers also exhibit an inability to 
adapt control systems to changing needs, producing informs-
tion systems that actually foster a lack of user motivation 
to accept, maintain, and improve controls. 
Thomas also notes that information processing, as the 
primary means of adaptation to the environment, is done 
within and by the social system, and that the social system 
is thus the primary determinant of the effectiveness of 
information processing potential. Similarly, the social 
system can be seen as the determinant in control effective-
ness. Lack of user involvement is one of the most serious 
problems in Systems Analysis/Systems Design <Bostrom and 
Heinen, 1977a). Similarly, the OA literature includes a 
number of discussions on auditee acceptance of audit 
findings,s with the general conclusions that auditees do not 
feel that findings are always relevant, and that the audi-
tors, rather than the auditees, are responsible for the 
control system. 
In many cases, the lack of user acceptance and mainten-
ance of control systems may stem from different perceptions 
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among auditors and auditees. In Argyris" 1970 study, "MIS 
users saw the designers as secretive, while the designers 
saw themselves as rational reformers who design efficient 
systems for an inadequate line management. User participa-
tion was encouraged for MIS acceptance, rather than for 
collaborative problem-solving and design [emphasis added]" 
(in Thomas, 1985, p. 381 ). The same misconceptions may 
occur between auditors and audltees - the auditor, despite 
his/her intentions, may be perceived as an externally im-
posed "watch-dog" who is interested in fault-finding rather 
than cooperative problem-solving. 
Consistent with the Scientific Management paradigm, 
systems analysts encourage •• ••• structured systems with 
well-defined job descriptions and hierarchical CsicJ lines 
of authority emphasizing order, stability and technical 
efficiency•• <Thomas, 1985, p. 27). This is true of internal 
auditors as well. In MIS, one result of such systems is 
that feedback on performance goes to managers rather than to 
workers. Managers, however, may not be in a position to act 
on the information in a timely manner, or the information 
itself may not be received when it is needed. This results 
in a duplication of the formal MIS in the form of an in-
formal information system, resulting in wasted resources and 
suboptimal performance. An audit that ignores the social 
subsystem within an organization will not discover these 
informal information systems, will not develop a true 
picture of the entity under audit, and therefore cannot 
fully address any existing problems in the control or 
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information eyeteme. 
In MIS, this interaction between the social and the 
technical systems has been ignored, with the result that 
tasks lack interest (resulting in unmotivated employees) and 
decision-making is moved further and further up the manage-
ment hierarchy. Other effects are less communication at the 
lowest operational levels and increasingly centralized 
controls. 
Management Accounting Systems 
One result of the Scientific Management paradigm that 
has plagued Management Accounting Systems <MAS) is a goal 
orientation toward detective controls. Reports tell manage-
ment what went wrong in the past, long after any corrective 
action can be taken, unless the situation is an ongoing one. 
In many cases, Operational Audits also function as detective 
controls. Audits conducted long after the fact may disclose 
operating problems that have since been resolved. Further-
more, since operational auditors look to management for the 
standards against which they audit, the auditors may not be 
any better than management at identifying emerging threats 
and opportunities that would require new responses. 
In most audits, changes in operating procedures promul• 
gated by management will be considered and, if justified, 
new standards are adopted as the criteria against which to 
evaluate findings. Seldom does the auditor consider whether 
management's response was timely or whether new circumstan-
ces are emerging which would necessitate another change. 
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This viewpoint is illustrated in Crosby's (1986) statement 
that "corrective action involves a system designed to 
resolve problems forever by identifying, communicating, and 
documenting work processes that prevent those problems from 
happening again" (p. 35). In a turbulent environment, the 
same problem may recur, but due to a different cause, or due 
to an external cause beyond the control of the company. 
Eliminating the cause may thus be impossible. It therefore 
becomes paramount to develop a variety of appropriate 
responses to the problem. 
A second problem in MAS resulting from the Scientific 
Management paradigm is the emphasis on upper management as 
the focal or key recipient of management accounting informa-
tion <Thomas, 1985), which is used for performance appraisal 
purposes. This encourages competition among departments 
which results in local optimization rather than global 
optimization. The information that upper management 
receives includes performance variances resulting from both 
internal <controllable) and external <uncontrollable) 
sources. The manager's defense, again, is to maintain his 
or her own informal information system with which to keep 
track of uncontrollable events. The resulting lack of 
motivation to maintain and support the formal MAS on the 
part of the Operations Managers responsible for its data 
input, integrity, and relevance, is an internal control 
problem <Thomas, 1985) which brings it within the realm of 
Operational Auditing4. 
In summary, then, an organization operating under the 
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Sc:ientlf"ic: Mana.gement pat-.adigm may not poeeeee the t"'equiei te 
responses necessary to cope with increased environmental 
turbulence. The most salient feature of the Scientific 
Management perspective is the lack of consideration of the 
social subsystem of an organization, stemming from a Theory 
X management style. Numerous problems resulting from this 
perspective have been identified in OD, MIS, and MAS. 
Operational Auditing has been shown to originate with and 
rely upon the Scientific Management/Theory X perspective, 
and the resulting problems apply to OA as well. Further-
more, because OA directly influences the tenor of workers' 
tasks and interactions between organizational subsystems, OA 
can be said to be concerned with organizational design and 
information system design. Thus, it is reaspnable to pro-
pose that STSA, a process-methodology that has been shown to 
overcome these problems on these higher control system le-
vels, be applied to OA in order to solve similar problems. 
The remainder of this chapter is a discussion of STSA 
theory. 
Socio-Technical Systeme Analysis <STSA) 
The basic premise of STSA, set forth by Bostrom and 
Heinen < 1977a) is that ••technology is essentially neutral: 
whether its application succeeds or fails depends entirely 
on the decisions that are made on how it shall be used" (p. 
18). An implication of this <Miller and Rice, 1967) is that 
the "work organization is not uniquely determined by the 
technical system and that alternative organizational models 
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are often available" Cp. 31 ). As Davis <1981) notes "the 
technical system defines the tasks to be performed and the 
social system prescribes the way in which they are per-
formed" <p. 25). A needed shift from a focus on jobs and 
tasks to a focus on the roles and sub-systems operating 
within the organization, should result in these sub-systems 
being able to control variances through self-regulation and 
adaptation to the environment <Thomas, 1985). According to 
STSA theory, this shift contributes to joint optimization of 
both technical and social systems, recognition of work sys-
tem boundaries that consider interdependencies, and a role 
content emphasis rather than a job content emphasis (Davis 
and Taylor, 1979). 
STS theory depends on two basic concepts. The first is 
that "organizations are artifacts, purposively created to 
serve man's needs•• <Thomas, 1985, p. 14). Organizations are 
a mechanism through which man adapts to the environment, a~d 
so must be adaptable and flexible <Simon, 1969). The second 
concept is that "every socio-technical system is embedded in 
an environment influenced by cultures and values" <Thomas, 
1985, p. 14). Understanding of an organization <or part 
thereof) cannot be achieved without understanding of the 
environment within which it oper~tes <Davis and Trist, 
1974). 
Contrary to Scientific Management, "which considers 
humans as unreliable machine components fitted to a norma-
tive technical design," <Thomas, 1985, p. 14), STSA theory 
requires that workers have both the discretion and ability 
t.o t"'eapond t.o a vat"'iety of c: it"'C:Uirn-atanc:ea, aa well aa the 
commitment to perform necessary tasks on their own initia-
tive. An organizational Control Chain of Causation, then, 
might look as followss• 
1. For the economic goals of the organization to 
be satisfied, the production process must 
function efficiently, economically, and 
effectively. 
2. If appropriate responses are not taken to 
random events as they occur, the production 
process will not function as specified in 
( 1 ) • 
3. If the organizational members are not commit-
ted to their roles, or they lack the neces-
sary control skills, they will not respond 
appropriately. 
4. Commitment cannot be forced or bought: it 
must be designed into the jobs and roles 
assigned to people. 
5. Appropriate information and training are 
necessary in order that people have the 
control skills required to identify and 
perform necessary control actions when 
needed. 
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An open, Socio-Technical system design fosters consid-
eration of these characteristics. The properties of an open 
Socio-Technical system have been identified by Davis <1981, 
pp. 28-29) as follows: 
equi-finality: the ability to follow differ-
ent suitable paths to achieve accepted 
outcomes; 
requisite response capa~ility: members 
possess the repertoire of knowledge, skills, 
and authorities to match the variety of 
demands faced by the organization; 
self-regulation: the organizational unit 
decides how and when it will apply its 
response capability; 
relevant boundaries: requires that the 
boundaries around each organizational unit be 
so located as to include all the means 
necessary to achieve the desired organiza-
tional outcomes. 
Achieving these properties requires the development of new 
strategies to cope with change. These new strategies 
include considering policy-making as a learning process, 
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building research capabilities into the organization, utili-
zatlon of professionals in collaborative research projects, 
and predominantly project and research oriented training 
<Herbst, 1974). The key ingredient for success in develop-
ing these new policies is user involvement, achieved through 
a methodology which considers the social subsystem to be a 
primary component of the total organization. 
Bostrom and Heinen (1977b> define three phases of STSA: 
the Strategic Design Process <the "Scan">, the Socio-
Technical System Design Process <including Technical and 
Social System Analysis), and an Ongoing Management Process 
<kAnalysis, Design, Redesign phase). The change process 
should be managed by the users. People should have the 
opportunity to ask questions and discuss problems. Retrain-
ing should be provided where workers are deficient in the 
skills necessary to cope with the system <Bostrom and 
Heinen, 1977b). The most effective point at which the user 
can participate is in the Strategic Design Process: formul-
ating and reformulating the goals and policies which guide 
the systems design activities <Bostrom and Heinen, 1977a). 
Having users focus on this stage can facilitate dealing with 
issues of user participation and responsibility in the 
actual analysis, design, and maintenance of specific inter-
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n.al ccmtr·ole. 
The purpose of the Str.ategic Deeign Process is "to 
combine relevant MIS and user personnel into a steering 
group in order to define the values and goals which direct 
the project" <Bostrom and Heinen, 1977b, p .15 >. After the 
Steering Committee develops a policy document and identifies 
system boundaries, interactions, and problems, a Design Team 
is selected to carry out the actual modifications of the 
syst.em. The operation.al audi t.or functions as a design 
engineer, working with the auditees, within the Steering 
Committ~e. The auditor together with key users <auditees) 
would form the Design Team, with expert assistance as needed 
from EDP, Finance, and other personnel. 
Once the Strategic Design Process is comp~ete and this 
policy document is produced, the Steering Committee should 
translate the output of the process into technically opera-
tional solutions. During the Design/Redesign phase, the 
alternatives should be developed from the data collected 
about the goals for the redesign. The design engineer, 
then, must "present the widest range of techno-economically 
feasible alternatives" <Herbst, 1974, p.8) in order to 
develop an organization that is both more satisfying to its 
members and more effective in meeting task requirements 
<Bostrom and Heinen, 1977a). 
In addition to analyzing the social system, the tech-
nical syst.em must be analyzed. Dt"'ucker ( ·1970) proposes that 
work may provide the focal role for understanding the system 
of technology. The Technical System, then, is the proces-
ses, tasks, and technology needed to transform inputs into 
outputs <Bostrom and Heinen, 1977b). The Technical System 
Analysis is conducted as follows: 
1. Identify the unit operations <the physical 
product transformations). Think about and 
list every single step that must take place 
to produce acceptable output. Now group 
these steps together into larger units 
representing significant transformations in 
the production process. 
2. List all the individual operations or steps 
required within each unit operations. 
3. Identify the production variances within each 
unit operations. Think'about and list all 
the things that could be defective or 
substandard about the ingredients or raw 
materials, and could go wrong with the tools, 
procedures, methods, or equipment. Under 
each unit operations, list the variances 
caused by the ingredients, the machinery, the 
procedures, or the methods used that could 
cause that particular unit operations to 
either fall to produce acceptable output or 
make it difficult for the employees to 
produce it e·asily, smoothly, and inexpensive-
ly. 
4. Identify the key variances. Construct a 
variance analysis matrix by listing the unit 
operations down the left hand margin and then 
placing the appropriate variances on the 
diagonal of the blank matrix. Start at the 
top of the variance matrix with the first 
variance of the first unit operation and 
determine if this variance causes or exacer-
bates any of the other variances in the 
matrix. Go through the entire matrix in this 
fashion, one column (variance) at a time. If 
two variances do intera~t with each other, 
place an "X" in the box where the two varian-
ces intersect. 
5. Construct a Key Variance Control Table by 
placing the key variances in the left hand 
column and answering the questions that 
appear across the top of the table for each 
key variance. 
One of the tools available to assist in the Technical 
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System Analysis is. the Vat-·ianc:e Analyeie Matr·ix ( Aneat-·i, 
1979). This is an "A x B" matrix where dimension A is the 
nature or significance of the variance <expected versus 
unexpected) and dimension B is the source of origin of the 
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variance: internal <within a department), external <within 
some other department), or exogenous <from outside the 
company>. 
The Variance Control Table lists, for each key vari-
ance, the unit operation where the. variance originates., the 
point at which the variance is observed, the point at which 
the variance is controlled, who or what controls the vari-
ance, what actions are taken to control the variance, and 
what information is used; and from which sources, to control 
the variance. 
STSA considers both the social and the technical sub-
systems. The social system is concerned with the attributes 
of people <attitudes, skills, values), the relationships 
among people, and the reward systems and authority struc-
tures <Bostrom and Heinen, 1977a). Two potential improve-
ment in satisfying social system needs are improved task 
accomplishment and increased worker satisfaction (higher 
quality of working life, or QWL>. Systems designers must 
consider the needs of all users ~f the system, otherwise, 
the system will create dysfunctional behavior in organiza-
tional members/users who are not served by the system <such 
as maint.enance of private information systems). As an 
ongoing policy, Herbst <1974) advocates the use of "Social 
Monitoring - The development of capacities for the rapid 
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recognition and evaluation of emerging and evolving social, 
psychological, and technological trends" (p. 62). According 
to Bostrom and Heinen <1977b), "STS tends toward Theory Y •.. 
The individual is viewed as someone who wants to contribute 
to organizational goals and wants to use not only his/her 
skills and abilities, but also to become increasingly 
competent in mastering his/her environment" (p. 14). 
According to STS theory, then, the social system is an 
important component of the total organization, and must 
therefore be analyzed in detail. Four areas are included in 
the Social System Analysis <Bostrom and Heinen, 1977b): the 
individual needs, characteristics, and abilities of people 
in the work system; the internal work system characteris-
tics; the external environment of the work system; and the 
support systems available for that work system. This analy-
sis encompasses six factors <Bostrom and Heinen, 1977b): 
1. Initial scan of the social· system problems, 
conducted as general, open-ended questions to 
the workers. 
2. Map the communication role network - focus on 
task-based interaction with people. 
3. Individual role analysis - consideration of 
the psychological characteristics of jobs. 
4. Analysis of existing work group, including 
attitudes about the existing work group 
performance. 
5. Analysis of the work system's external 
environment, including interactions with 
other departments. 
6. Analysis of support systems, including 
payroll, performance evaluation, training, 
budgeting and promotion. 
The map in factor 2 includes such information as who each 
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person works for, the nature of interactions between a 
worker and others, the importance of each interaction, and 
the frequency of communications. Factor 3 may include 
having employees rate job characteristics for variety, 
challenge, decision making, learning, relevance, contribu-
tion, and future. It may utilize a Job Diagnosis Survey6. 
The Social System Analysis is conducted in three steps: 
. 
1. Determine the focal role(s), which are those 
roles th~t are essential to the creation of 
the product <or service). 
2. Construct a Role Network showing the close-
ness and direction of communication between 
the focal role occupant and other role 
members of the organization. 
3. Complete the Social Systems Grid as an aid to 
identifying social interactions with the 
.focal role. 
The Social System Analysis and the Technical System Analysis 
will be discussed in mar~ detail in the next chapter. 
The Ongoing Management Phase consists of successive 
iterations of the previous phases. The system is continu-
ously monitored to determine if it is meeting its goals. 
This would be accomplished through periodic reviews in the 
same manner that repeat audits of certain systems are now 
conducted. The same basic systems methodology is used to 
analyze the redesigned system. 
Conclusion 
The development of STSA is a reaction to the Scientific 
Management perspective prevalent in business today, and to 
the increasing turbulence of the environment in which 
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businesses must operate. Problems previously identified in 
Organizational Design <OD>, Management Information Systems 
<MIS), and Management Accounting Systems <MAS) which result 
from these two factors are also seen or can be deduced in 
OA. The fact that STSA has been proposed as an acceptable 
methodology to solve problems arising in other areas from 
the prevalence of the Scientific Management paradigm and 
from the turbulent environment leads to the belief that STSA 
should be adopted in OA and can produce "good results". 
STS theory depends on two basic concepts. The first is 
that organizations are a mechanism through which man adapts 
to the environment, and so must be adaptable and flexible. 
Second, every Socio-Technical System is embedded in an 
environment influenced by cultures and values. The work 
organization is not uniquely determined by the technical 
systems: alternative organizational models are often 
available. Since OA directly influences the tenor of 
workers' tasks and interactions between organizational 
subsystems, OA can be considered to be involved in OD, MIS, 
and MAS designs. Thus, a design methodology is needed that 
considers.the social and technical subsystems as integral 
components of the organization and that can provide integ-
rated procedures allowing "control" to be viewed, analyzed, 
and developed consistently on all hierarchical levels within 
the organization's control structure. 
The methodology of Socio-Technical Systems Analysis is 
fairly well defined but somewhat complex. The next chapter 
presents this methodology in detail, within the context of 
79 
tion process Operational Audit. 
ENDNOTES 
1. Thomas, 1987. CWP #87-19). 
2. While the literature has not explicitly dealt with the 
development of postulates specifically for Operational 
Auditing, from Mautz and Sharaf's discussion it can be 
inferred that continuity is assumed in Operational Auditing 
as well as Financial Auditing: operational auditors assume 
some continuity of circumstances from one period to the next 
when engaged in repeat audits of a particular entity. A 
complete development of postulates for Operational Auditing 
is beyond the scope of this work. 
3. See, for example, Nich, David L., Gift, Robert G. and 
Zeb, Jahan. "The Future of Operational Auditing," Internal 
Auditing (Summer, 1987): 3-11. 
4. A related problem for EDP auditors is the erosion of 
data integrity. However, the problems of the specialized 
sub-field of EDP auditing are outside the relevant consider-
ations of this work. 
5. Modified from Thomas' modification of Davis' (1971) 
organizational chain of causation. 
6. See Hackman, J.R. et al., Perspectives on Behavior in 
Organizations. New York: .McGraw-Hill, 1977. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AN EXAMPLE OF A SOCIO-TECHNICAL 
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS BASED 
OPERATIONAL AUDIT 
This final c:hapte:t"' pl"'esents the Soc:io=Technic:al Systems 
Analysis <STSA> methodology, first in general, and through 
the use of a specific Operational Auditing <OA) example. 
The example is an analysis of the Cotter-Cherns Scottish 
Sandwich Corp., Ltd. <CCSSC), manufacturing process for 
vending machine of ham and cheese sandwiches1. While the 
example analyzes an entire production process, the methodol-
ogy is equally well suited to the analysis of any department 
or function within an organization. 
Phases or Steps of a Soclo-Technical Analysis 
The first phase in the STSA is the Organizational 
Scan2- The purpose of the Scan is the analysis of the 
organization, its environment, and its products. In OA 
terms, this is a Familiarization step. The Scan is conduc-
ted in four steps: 
1. Think about the organization, and identify 
its goals and objectiv.es. 
2. Environmental Analysis. Think about and list 
any environmental considerations that affect 
the organization and its products. Specifi-
cally identify any important threats and 
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opportunities that management should be aware 
of when they plan the objectives and goals. 
3. Organizational Analysis. Think about and 
list those internal factors about the 
organization itself that influence its 
strengths and weaknesses. This step should 
be based upon problems that organizational 
members have communicated during the Scan, 
descriptions of the people required to 
manufacture the product, the development of 
a~ organizational chart <Figure 6), and 
identification of the organization's physical 
boundaries <Plant Layout in Figure 7). 
4. Product Analysis. Think about and list 
exactly what the finished product should do 
and look like, and its quality requirements. 
Specify the output so that the output 
specifications can be used as detailed 
finished goods standards. Consider the list 
of environmental constraints identified in 
.Step 2. Based on the list of detailed 
finished goods standards that need to be 
satisfied, think about and list all the raw 
materials <inputs necessary to produce the 
output. This specification of the inputs can 
be used as detailed raw material standards. 
The outputs <workpapers) of this first phase, then, are a 
list of organizational goals and objectives, a list of 
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environmental threats and opportunities, a list of organiza-
tional strengths and weaknesses, and detailed output and 
input specifications for products. 
The second phase in the STSA is the Technical Analysis. 
The purpose of the Technical Analysis is to analyze the 
production proce~s in order to develop an Inptit/Output model 
of the product transformation process. The Technical 
Analysis is accomplished in five steps: 
1. Identify the unit operations <the physical 
product transformations). Think about and 
list every single step that must take place 
to produce acceptable output. Now group 
these steps together into larger units 
representing significant transformations in 





















\ PHODIIC1' QUALITY 
\ 
\ 
\ . I I 
\ DEPT. IIEAD DEPT. IIEAD 
\ 
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT· PACKAGING, INSPECTION 
& & 
' 
HIPROVEMEN'r QUALITY ASSURANCE 
\ 
'------------- I I I I 
DEP'I'. HEAD DEPT. IIEAD DEPT. IIEAD 
I 
CIIEESE PHEP. LE'1'1'lJCE PREP. ASSEMBLY I 


















I -- I 
DEPT. IIEAD DEP'r. IIEAD 
MAINTENANCE THANSPOHTA'l'ION 
/~ 








ll SA LESt-lEN J 
C:> 
-+>. 
FIGURE 7. APPROXIMATE PLANT LAYOUT 









-( ~ ·-{ ) L-., )---,----~-
DEP'l'. IIEAD 
COUJ S'I'Ol~AGE FOR PROCESSED RAW MI\TERII\LS ASSEMBLY 
HI\REIIOIJSE AREA 
(Services L>cpl.) - l \ 
rf SANDHICII ASSEMBLY DEPI\H1'HEN'l' 






the production process. 
2. List all the individual operations or steps 
required within each unit operat~ons. 
3. Identify the production variances within each 
unit operations. Think about and list all 
the things that could be defective or 
substandard about the ingredients or raw 
materials, and could go wrong with the tools, 
procedures, methods, or equipment. Under 
each unit operation, list the variances 
caused by the ingredients, the machinery, the 
procedures, or the methods used that could 
cause that particular unit operations to 
either fail to produce acceptable output or 
m.ake it difficult fot"' t.he employees to 
produce it easily, smoothly, and inexpensive-
ly. 
4. Identify the key variances. Construct a 
Variance Analysis Matrix by listing the unit 
operations down the left hand margin and then 
placing the appropriate variances on the 
diagonal of the blank matrix. Start at the 
top of the Variance Matrix with the first 
variance of the first unit operation and 
determine if this variance causes or exacer-
bates any of the other variances in the 
matrix. Go through the entire matrix in this 
fashion, one column (variance) at a time. If 
two variances do interact with each other, 
place an "X" in the box where the two varian-
ces intersect. 
~- Construct a Key Variance Control Table by 
placing the key variances in the left hand 
column and answering the questions that 
appear across the top of the table for each 
key variance. 
The outputs for this second phase are a list of unit 
operations, a list of variances in a Variance Analysis 
Matrix, and a Key Variance Control Table. At this point, 
the Design Team (including the auditor) will have a better 
understanding of the system interdependencies, possible 
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problems, and key information communication points and data 
needed for control in the system being examined. 
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The third phase in the STSA is the Social Analysis. 
The purpose of this phase is to analyze the roles and role 
networks created within the organization design to satisfy 
the four basic functions of the social system <Goal Attain-
ment, Adaptation, Integration, and Long-Term Development). 
The Social Analysis is accomplished in three steps: 
1. Determine the focal role(s) in the social 
system by examining the roles required to 
create the product <or service) which 
directly meets the mission of the system. 
2. Construct a Role Network showing the close-
ness and direction of communication between 
the focal role occupant and other role 
senders. Identify all the essential social 
systems functions <G,A,I,L) for each of the 
network relationships with the focal role. 
3. Complete the Social Systems Grid using the 
information developed for the role network. 
The grid aids identifying social interactions 
with the focal role dealing with these four 
essential functions. 
The outputs for this third phase are thus the Role Network 
and the Social Systems Grid. After this phase, the auditor 
should have a fairly good idea of possible solutions to the 
problems facing the organization and specifically, what is 
needed to motivate the Key Focal Role members. 
The last phase in the STSA is the Design, Analysis, or 
Redesign Effort. The purpose of this phase is an identifi-
cation and clearer understanding of the issues to be 
addressed in meeting the organization's goals and objec-
tives. Solutions are identified and implemented for 
problems discovered during the previous phases of the 
analysis. The STSA can be used simply to provide a "fresh 
look" at an existing operations, as a formal procedure in a 
or organization. It is accomplished in two steps: 
1. Integration is achieved throughout the 
analysis by linking organizational objectives 
to goals; goals to the organizational design 
and production process <the technical 
system); and the technical system to the 
social system. In the Social System Grid, 
consider the following three questions: 
a. Think about the entry in each cell of 
the grid. Does it describe a positive, 
negative, or neutral condition? 
b. If left unchanged, will organizational 
effectiveness deteriorate, stay the 
same, or improve? 
c. Will the continuation of these relation-
ships frustrate or irritate the focal 
person(s)? 
2. Synthesis is achieved through the philosophy 
of joint optimization. Organizational goals 
lead to many different possible technologies. 
But to make the technology work, it must be 
viewed within the context of its effects on 
the social system required by it. The social 
system must, in turn, be considered within 
the context of individual human needs. 
The output of this last phase should be the completed 
analysis, including a list of problems and proposed solu-
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tions to those problems. The rest of this chapter discusses 
in detail an example of the STSA methodology applied to a 
ham and cheese manufacturing company3. 
The Organizational Scan 
Step 1: Organizational Oblectives and Goals. 
Objectives are long-run general statements concerning 
the purposes for the organization. Goals are tangible 
short-run specific targets that if accomplished will lead to 
the organization's objectives. The following are some of 
the objectives and goals identified for the CCSSC: 
A. Objectives: 
1. The stockholders are ma~nly old and want a 
consistent dividend record. 
2. An overriding concern is with consumer 
preference and expanding the company's market 
share. 
3. A healthy profit margin. and the desire to 
have fun while getting rich and doing the job 
well are also major concerns. 
B. Goals: 
1. A 15~ ROI is expected from all products and 
all new investments. 
2. Avoid food poisoning incidents at all costs. 
3. Strict compliance is required with all 
applicabl~ laws and regulations. 
Step 2: Environmental Analysis. 
These are external factors that influence how the 
company goes about producing and marketing its products. 
The following are just a few environmental considerations 
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that might be faced by a company planning to produce ham and 
cheese sandwiches: 
A. Environmental Threats: 
1. The firm is located in sunny southern 
California which encourages absenteeism and 
contains many competitors. See also Opportu-
nity #1. 
2. All workers must join the union which has 
been historically opposed to innovative 
changes proposed by the company for job 
design changes. 
3. Public health codes are strictly enforced. 
Since sandwiches are to be sold to the 
public, they muet be produced under sanitary, 
government inspected conditions <plastic 
gloves must be used when handling all 
consumable raw materials, finished sandwiches 
must be kept at 44 degrees F. until consump-
tion, etc. >. 
4. Technology and monetary conventions. The 
cost and size of the sandwiches will be 
constrained since they will only be sold 
through vending machines. 
5. Weather and economic conditions. The avail-
ability and cost of resources may affect the 
composition of the final product <a drought 
in California may make lettuce too costly, or 
unavailable, etc.). 
6. Consumer preferences or conventions of 
acceptability. In order to survive as a 
viable concern, the company must provide the 
public with what they demand (consumers may 
express preference for the following: 
lettuce on top, cheese next, ham slices next, 
mustard on the bottom slice, sandwich cut 
diagonally, etc.>. 
B. Environmental Opportunities 
1. Competition is for geographic areas and 
specific businesses, locations, etc. Con-
tracts with businesses, schools, etc, give a 
company sole distribution rights (i.e., only 
that company's vending machines and products 
will be sold within the business, school, 
etc. ) • 
2. The company is owned by elderly stockholders 
who can easily supply capital for new 
investments. 
3. There are many local suppliers for the raw 
materials needed to produce sandwiches. 
Step 3: Organizational Analysis. 
This is an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses 
within the company. 
A. Internal Strengths: 
1 . The managers are reasonable men and women who 
want to get rich and enjoy the good life, but 
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who also want to be just and benevolent 
employers. 
2. Delivery personnel often talk to customers 
when restocking vending machines and bring 
back customer comments to management <See 
Environmental Threat #6). 
3. Management has decided to concentrate all 
their efforts on making only one product, a 
quality ham and cheese sandwich. 
4. The mustard spreading machine, while very 
expensive, has a maximum spreading rate of 
500 slices/hour. This is well above any 
projected sales volumes. 
B. Internal Weaknesses: 
1. Management has decided to limit distribution 
to vending machines. Some larger firms 
(hospitals, schools, etc.> have cafeterias 
which might sell CCSSC sandwiches. 
2. The Ass~bly Department has historically 
experienced a high employee turnover rate of 
about 30% annually. This leads to a high 
number of rejects, not meeting production 
quotas, and uneven workflows when many 
workers are absent. 
3. Even though managers are friendly, maintain 
open lines of communication, and coordinate 
their activities, workers appear basically 
apathetic, bored, and antagonistic toward 
workers in other departments. They do seem 
honest and capable, though. 
C. Current Problems in Sandwich Production: 
1. There has been ·some difficulty in meeting 
scheduled production requirements in recent 
months. 
2. Many sandwiches approved by inspection are at 
the maximum size limits for the cardboard 
slips and vending machines. 
3. Poor packaging has resulted in penalties for 
health code violations. 
4. Turnover of assembly workers is a chronic 
problem. Inexperienced workers frequently 
leave before they are productive. 
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D. Organization Chart (see Figure 6) 
E. Plant Layout and Physical Boundaries of the Company 
<see Figure 7) 
Step 4: Product Analysis. 
This includes an analysis of all products made by the 
company. In this case, only one product is manufactured. 
A. Output Specifications: Output specifications for ham 
and cheese sandwiches might read as follows: 
1. Quality 
a. Two slices of equal size bread. 
b. Nutritional content will be specified 
for the bread, ham and cheese (fat, 
carbohydrates, vitamins, etc.). 
c. No overlap or mismatching of slices. 
d. Sandwiches should be taste-panel accep-
ted. 
e. Cut should be sharp and on the diagonal. 
f. Total dimensions of sandwiches should 
not exceed vendor purchased cardboard 
packing slips. 
g. Each sandwich should be individually 
wrapped in a cardboard packing slip 
surrounded by p+astic wrap. 
h. Plastic wrap should be heat sealed. 
i. Plastic should not be burned during 
sealing. 
j. Completed sandwich should be stored at 
44 degrees F. until consumption. 
2. Quantity 
a. Weekly schedules for production should 
be posted on the preceding Friday. 
b. Sales department should update produc-
tion requirements dally on the basis of 
feedback from route drivers. 
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B. Input Specifications: Input specifications for ham and 
cheese sandwiches that might be derived from previous 
output specifications, and from a list of environmental 
considerations, could read as follows: 
1 • Bread: Rye bread, two 15 gram slices, 4'' x 
4" x 1/4", no heels to be used, no 
visible mold, no ripped or mangled 
slices, freshness will equal 
predetermined level, etc. 
2. Ham: Two one-ounce slices, fat content 
of ham will equal some predeter-
mined level, visually the slices 
should have a good marbled texture, 
no gray or off-color slices should 
be used, salt content of ham should 
be equal to some predetermined 
level, ham should be held at or 
below 44 degrees F. at all times, 
workers handling the ham should use 
plastic sanitary gloves at all 
times, etc. 
3. Cheese: Domestic Swiss, a single one-ounce 
slice, fat content equal to some 
predetermined level, aged for three 
years, no visible mold, no ripped 
or double slices should be used, 
preservative content should not 
exceed some predetermined level, 
cheese should be palatable, only 
Kragt brand cheese should be used 
(because Mr. Kragt is the presi-
dent•s golfing partner>, cheese 
should be held at or below 44 
degrees F. at all times, etc. 
4. Lettuce: One layer evenly covering entire 
slice of bread, no visible bug 
damage, crispness should equal some 
predetermined level, no lumps or 
cores should be used -- hence outer 
leaves only, color should range 
from dark through light green - no 
white leaves are to be used , no 
more than three grams of lettuce to 
cover bread, no insecticides should 
have been used during the growing 
of the lettuce, etc. 
5. Mustard: Five cc•s, evenly spread on bottom 
slice, no slop over, yellow color, 
creamy and smooth, etc. 
The Technical System Analysis 
Steps 1 & 2: Unit Operations and Production Process. 
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The Scan should have developed a list of environmental 
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~onsiderations together with detailed output and input 
specifications. The next step in the process is to derive a 
detailed, sequential analysis of every step necessary to 
produce the product. From this listing it should be 
possible to summarize or regroup the process into recogni-
zable transformations of the raw materials as they move 
toward product completion. These larger blocks of activi-
ties will be called Unit Operations. 
Fot"' the ex.ample at hand, one "logical" appt"'oac:h tr:, 
making a ham and cheese sandwich might read as follows: 
Unit Operations Production Tasks 
Purchasing 
1 • Purchase correct amount & size of bread. 
2. Purchase correct amount, size and quality of ham. 
3. Purchase correct amount, size and quality of 
cheese. 
4. Purchase correct amount and quality of lettuce. 
5. Purchase correct amount and quality of mustard. 
6. Purchase correct amount of plastic gloves. 
7. Purchase correct amount and size of plastic wrap. 
8. Purchase correct amount and size of boxes. 
9. Purchase correct amount of wax paper. 
1 0. Purchase correct amount and size of labels. 
Receiving 
1. Receive and store all raw materialsand supplies. 
2. Store perishables in cold storage at 44 degrees F. 
3. Store bread in dry area. 
Ham Preparation 
1. Requisition quantity of ham needed for next day's 
production <2 slices/sandwich). 
2. Slice ham into 4" x 4" x 1 /4'' slices of one ounce 
weight. 
3. Stack sliced ham into containers (250 slices/con-
tainer). 
4. Inspect ham for quality while stacking. 
5. Store sealed containers in cold storage. 
A similar analysis should be done for lettuce and cheese 
preparation. 
Assembly: Bread Prepared 
1. Review daily production quota with Department 
Head. 
2. Get bread and mustard from storage area. 
3. Fill mustard machine with mustard. 
4. Insert one half of bread quota into machine. 
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5. Take remaining loaves of bread to work station #5. 
6. Set machine speed and turn on machine. 
7. As each slice of bread comes out of machine, place 
it mustard side up on an empty assembly tray <20 
slices/tray: 4 x 5 rows>. 
8. When assembly tray is full slide full tray to work 
station #2 and replace tray with clean em·pty tray 
from rack next to mustard machine. 
9. Repeat until scheduled daily quota of slices has 
been processed. 
Assembly: Ham Sub-Assemblies Attached 
1. Get container of ham slices from cold storage 
<slices previously prepared by Ham Cutting Depart-
ment>. 
2. Slide full tray of mustard-covered bread into 
position at work station. 
3. Neatly position•two slices of ham from the 
container on top of each mustard-covered slice of 
bread. 
4. Proceed until all 20 slices on tray are covered. 
5. Slide ham covered tray to worker at work station 
#3. 
6. Repeat operation until scheduled daily quota of 
trays is reached. 
Assembly: Cheese Sub-Assemblies Attached 
1. Get container of sliced cheese from cold storage 
(previously prepared by Cheese Preparation Depart-
ment). 
2. Slide full tray of ham-covered slices into 
position at work station. 
3. Neatly place one slice pf cheese from container on 
top of each piece of ham-covered bread. 
4. Proceed until entire tray of 20 ham-covered slices 
has been covered with cheese. 
5. Slide cheese covered tray to work station #4. 
6. Repeat operations until scheduled daily quota of 
trays is reached. 
The analysis should continue through the entire 
process, including: inserting lettuce, adding the top slice 
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cf bread, cutting, packaging, and inspecting the finished 
sandwich. 
Step 3: Identify the Production Process Variances. 
Once the production process has been decomposed into a 
number of unit operations, think about where and how the 
process could conceivably go wrong. Generate a list of 
potential things that could, if they occurred, disrupt the 
normal, smooth, efficient production r::Jf the finished 
product. Remember that these potential problems <or 
VARIANCES> could encompass: deviations in raw materials; 
defective tools and equipment; or incorrect methods and 
procedures used by management or employees. 
Potential variances that might be detected in the unit 
operations within the Assembly Department are found below. 
Note that this is only a sampling for the purpose of 
explaining the variance control technique, thus, there may 
well be other additional variances to consider. At the same 
time, some of these variances might not be of any concern if 
the output specifications were not as detailed (i.e., making 
a sandwich during a T.v.· commercial while the football game 
is on>. 







Edges of bread curled. 
Bread improperly fed into machine. 
Amount of prepared bread. 
Temperature of ham too high. 
Slices of ham tao thick. 





Ham dirty or contaminated. 
Ham slices misaligned on bread. 
Cheese moldy. 
Wax wrap still on edges. 
Slices stick together. 
Cheese misaligned on bread. 
Lettuce lumpy. 
Excessive water on leaves. 
Inadequate supply of top slices. 
Size of slices incorrect. 
Sandwich top not level. 
The aim of the technical system analysis is to help 
identify those variances which significantly affect the 
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capability of the production system to pursue its objectives 
in one or more unit operations. One way to identify key 
variances is to look at the interdependencies between them, 
and the matrix format (Figure 8> helps to do this. The 
matrix points out relationships among the variances and 
highlights major clusters or chains of cause-and-effect 
relationships, thus providing a formalized map of the events 
that need to be controlled by the social system. 
A Variance Control Table <Figure 9> reports the extent 
to which each key variance is presently controlled by the 
social system and where important organizational and 
informational loops exist, or are required. The control 
table is used to clarify the following data: 
1. In what unit operation the variance occurs. 
2. Where it is observed for the first time. 
3. Where it is controlled and by whom. 
4. What control actions are undertaken. 
5. What information flow is involved in the diagnosis 
and control activity. 
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Note that. in the example her·e ~ we have not. explir::i t.ly 
investigated problems caused by Maintenance, suppliers, or 
customers. In a full-scale Operational Audit, it is 
advisable to examine the impact which these systems have on 







Identify the maintenance variances. 
Examine how they are being controlled. 
Identify varianr.::es being paesed into the eyet.em by 
those who supply raw materials or those who use 
the products. 
Examine how they are being controlled. 
Examine how their effects could be diminished. 
Step 4: Identify the Key Variances. 
In Figure 8, 28 variances are considered to be Key 
Variances. A Key Variance is any variance that, if it 
occurred during the production process, would seriously 
disrupt the efficient, production of the sandwiches. 
By reviewing the environmental considerations that are 
faced- by the CCSSC sandwich company and the output specifi-
cations that have been placed on the production process, it 
should be possible to generate a list of occurrences that 
should be avoided at all costs. This list will help to 
determine the Key Process Variances which need to be care-
fully controlled. As further explanation, the following are 
some of the reasons behind giving these 28 variances the 
special status of Key Variances: 
Variance #22 <Soggy Bread): 
Bread with a high moisture content, from whatever 
source (purchase of low quality bread, improper 
storage) jams the mustard spreading machine and thus 
shuts down the line completely until the maintenance 
department can send someone to unclog the machine. 
Since the line loses $50/minute when it is down, 
management wants to avoid this situation. 
Variance #32 <Lumpy Lettuce): 
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Although at first this may seem like a minor item, it 
is obvious from the matrix that this variance is worthy 
of further attention. Looking down the column labeled 
32 on Figure 8, note that lumpy lettuce causes or 
interacts with seven other variances that appear later 
in the matrix. Lumpy lettuce makes it hard for the 
operator in Packaging to level and cut the sandwiches 
with lumpy lettuce in them, and likewise to package and 
seal sandwiches that contain lumpy lettuce. Hence, 
because it potentially leads to so many other problems 
further down the line, lumpy lettuce has been singled 
out as a Key Variance. 
Variance #49 <Plastic Wrap Does Not Seal): 
This is considered a Key Variance because the local 
health board deems unsealed sandwiches to be in 
violation of its health codes. Compliance with health 
codes is a primary goal of this company. 
Step 5: Construct the Key Variance Control Table. 
Figure 9 is a partial Key Variance Control Table 
illustrating the information required for each key variance 
identified in Step 4. Below are brief summaries of three 
process variances found in Figure 9 together with some 
preliminary suggestions concerning how they might be 
controlled in a more effective manner. 
Variance #22 <Soggy Bread): 
The cause of this variance is either (a) the 
purchase of low quality bread with high moisture 
content, or (b) the improper storage of bread 
during warehousing. It appears that the variance 
is being transported across several organizational 
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bound~riee CSee Figure 6) and le not being discovered 
unt.il it reaches the Assembly Department where control 
of the variance is currently impossible. 
The variance is observed in the Assembly 
Department. Experienced operators sometimes catch 
the problem before it is too late, because they 
know what brands of bread will jam their machine. 
Inexperienced operators do not, however, and as a 
result slices of bread are mangled, curled, or 
soggy and jam the equipment. When this happens, 
the line has to be shut down until maintenance can 
unclog the machine. 
Given the current structure and practices of 
the organization, this valuable piece of informa-
tion that experienced production workers hold 
never seems to find its way back to the purchasing 
agent or the warehouse forem~n. Hence, corrective 
action is seldom forthcoming. Instead the 
maintenance department or the vendor of the 
mustard machine get the complaints -- complaints 
arise, of course, after the frustrated workers 
sometimes either force the soggy bread into the 
equipment so to <hopeful 
ly) focus attention on the real source of the 
variance, or simply keep their_mouths shut because 
they "don•t get paid to think." 
Potential Suggestions for Improvements: 
1. Search for and purchase a new mustard sprea-
ding machine that wi_ll not jam up as often. 
2. Install a humidity tent prior to the mustard 
machine to ensure that all bread entering the 
mustard machine has the proper moisture 
content. 
3. Live with the current scrap rate and periodi-
cally fire the bread preparers because they 
cannot make the production quotas. 
4. Change the goals and rewards for the Purcha-
sing Department so that they better coincide 
with the overall organizational mission of 
making good quality ham and cheese sandwiches 
as efficiently as possible. 
5. Expand the boundary of the Assembly Depart-
ment so that they have some control over the 
purchasing of assembly-related inputs, such 
as bread. 
Variance ~32 <Lumpy Lettuce): 
Again, here is a variance that occurs in one 
organizational unit and is then transported across 
a boundary to wreak havoc on another department. 
This problem apparently arises because of conflic-
ting goals in two different organizational units. 
Since the Lettuce Preparation Department bonus is 
based upon speed of processing and low scrap rate 
<weight of raw heads compared to weight of 
processed lettuce) they often are less than 
careful about shipping cores and unprocessed 
lettuce (lumps) to the Assembly Department. In 
this fashion, the lettuce department looks good 
because they cut their scrap rate and more than 
meet their schedule for processing time. 
However, the Assembly Department is charged 
for lettuce containers by weight <so many sandwi-
ches per container of lettuce> and hence looks bad 
when unscheduled time is required to process the 
lettuce or discard the cores or make lumpy sandwi-
ches. As the situation is currently structured, 
the Assembly Department has three alternatives: 
(a) produce lumpy sandwiches in which case other 
variances will be caused further down the line, or 
the sandwich will fail final inspection, (b) stop 
and process the lettuce (crush the lumps) in which 
case they will fail to make their time-studied 
quota, or <c> scrap the lumps in which case they 
will be penalized for us~ng too little lettuce on 
each sandwich, or too much lettuce if more is 
requisitioned. 
The Assembly Department appears to be caught 
in a classic Catch-22 situation. Regardless of 
what they do, they are going to look bad (at least 
according to the Cost Variance Reports management 
receives) while the Lettuce Preparation Department 
looks great. 
Potential Suggestions for Improvements: 
1. Change the reward structures of these two 
departments so as to reduce this clash in 
goals. As it now stands, performance 
measures for these two departments are 
inappropriate for getting the total system to 
produce a complete, high quality sandwich. 
Tie the Lettuce Prepar~tion Department's 
performance to the Assembly Department via 
some sort of joint reward structure. 
2. Install lettuce shredding machinery. 
3. Change some of the boundaries inside the 
organization so that workers inserting the 
lettuce into the sandwiches actually prepare 
their own supply of raw materials prior to 
final assembly. 
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Variance ~49 CPlsetic Wrap Doee Not Seal): 
This variance is internal to the packaging 
department and therefore does not involve crossing 
organizational boundaries. 
Potential Suggestions for Improvement: 
1. Job rotation, so workers could gain a fuller 
appreciation of the need for meeting produc-
tion tolerances and output specifications. 
2. Introduce a better training program to alert 
new workers to the potential problems that 
might arise via their sloppy work. 
If theee et.epe do not :t"'ecti f:y the problem, then Row 49 of 
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Figure 8 should be re-examined for secondary causes of the 
variance (such as ham slices too thick, or wax wrap still on 
cheese). 
Social System Analysis 
The purpose of the social part of a Socio-Technical 
System is to provide the control, coordination, adaptabill-
ty, and flexibility that enables a particular technical 
system to achieve its goals. Part of this is through social 
control of key variances, and part is through performing 
other activities related to adaptability and flexibility. 
Assemblages <such as crowds) differ from systems <such 
as organizations) because systems have structure. Organiza-
tions typically contain collections of positions a~d jobs to 
which sets of behaviors have been assigned. These assigned 
behaviors are not completely specified in advance. Indivi-
dual people occupying a position have expectations about it. 
Positions also involve legitimate expectations by others 
which are seldom formally defined. 
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The techniques of sandwich-making have been analyzed 
above. The organization positions invented by CCSSC for 
sandwich-making and for services to production are shown in 
Figure 6. The people filling the positions in the sandwich-
making system have also been briefly described. 
Step 1: Identify the Focal Roles. 
This is a useful bridging concept between people and 
positions. A role is a set of expectations and specified 
behaviors assigned to a position being occupied by someone 
having relationships with other people in other roles. By 
its structure, an organization assigns activities to 
positions, and then assigns positions to specific individu-
als and/or groups. Individuals holding these positions 
create roles by exercising their individual needs and wants 
in the positions. Positions without people are not roles. 
People without positions are not role-occupants. 
People communicate their expectations to other people 
about the positions they hold in an organization. These 
people are the role senders. Role senders transmit their 
own interpretations plus their own expectations. Role 
occupants hear partly what their role set Ci.e., all role 
senders) interpret and send, and partly what the occupant 
interprets and expects. So role behavior is a combination 
of: 
1. Influential role senders, 
2. The expectations of the role occupant, and 
3. The situation the role occupant finds 
him/ho::n"'sel f in ( lnvol vee physlc~l, social and 
psychological constraints>. 
In other words, individuals have a tendency to act as 
wholes, and not just simply in terms of their formal 
assignments. Obviously, there is seldom a perfect fit 
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between individual role expectations and organization role 
expectations. Some form of accommodation is required 
between them. So, efforts must be made to clarify and 
satisfy mutual expectations. Otherwise, dysfunctional 
behavior will result (often characterized by low producti-
vity, apathy, absenteeism, etc.) 
The social analysis attempts to examine this accommoda-
tion between roles. Unless unlimited time and money exist 
to undertake an examination of every organizational role in 
the social analysis, it is necessary to identify a focal 
role <or a limited number of such roles) to adequately 
examine the mutual expectations described above. In a 
Socio-Technical Analysis, the most important roles are those 
most closely involved in the control of key variances. 
These roles should be taken as the focal point. 
Figure 10 illustrates some of the formal and informal 
expectations influencing the Assembly Department worker. 
Here the assembly worker is viewed as a key focal role, 
because it is the worker who can best control the relevant 
factors which produce controllable co~t variances. The 
assembly manager sees that workers follow production 
schedules, health codes, and job performance standards. 
He/she checks their performance, and informs them of 
FIGURE 10. EXPECTATIONS INFLUENCING THE 
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deviations. Other employees send their expectations too. 
Production workers send expectations about not working too 
fast. Maintenance workers send expectations about not 
complaining too much about the machines. Warehouse workers 
and other operations workers in the food preparation areas 
send expectations to the assembly worker about ·not complai-
ning too much about short supplies, or poor quality materi-
als. Assembly workers, if they are disinterested in the job 
or not easily influenced by others, may disregard many of 
these sent expectations and behave in the way they wish. 
This disregard may be seen by the role sende~s as uncooper-
ative or unfriendly behavior, and the role senders may 
become aggressive, hostile, or punishing (depending upon 
their personal attributes.). Thus, the focal role occupant 
may influence his or_her own role behavior, and ignore the 
role senders, or he/she may be changed by the role senders. 
Step 2: Construct the Role Network. 
Any social system, if it is to survive, is required to 
perform four basic functions. These are: 
( Ci): 
C A): 
C I ) : 






Every organization exists in order to meet the short-term 
goal of producing its product (Ci). However, in doing so it 
must not adversely impact its capacity to survive as an 
organization. To survive it must adapt to, and be protected 
from short term changes and pressures in its immediate 
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environment. (A). 
ties to manage internal conflict and to promote smooth 
interactions among people(!). Finally, it must ensure the 
long-term development of knowledge, skills, and motivation 
to cope with goal-related, environmental, and systems 
requirements in the future <L>. 
Many organizations have departments to perform these 
functions. For example, Industrial Engineering, Planning, 
Personnel, and Training departments can have the main 
responsibilities for one or another of the four basic 
functions. Yet, we know from experience that not all such 
activities are handled by special departments. Indeed, 
informal activities at the level of the Focal Role are often 
more frequent and more influential in affecting functional 
behavior than formal methods. 
The task for any social system analysis is to map the 
structures and relationships in which the required social 
system functions get carried out, and to look at interactive 
relationships within and between the various subsystems 
involved. This mapping involves examining the purposes 
served by existing relationships, as.portrayed in the Role 
Network analysis <Figure 11) and examining the presence or 
absence of a fixed set of functional relationships in a 
Social Systems Grid <Figure 12>. 
Figure 11 shows the Focal Role of Sandwich Assembly 
Worker in relation to other employees <Role Senders). These 
role senders include the Assembly Manager, other assembly 
workers <other stations, other shifts), other operations 
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workers (Lettuce Preparation workers, etc.). Figure 11 
demonstrates that the concept of a social role becomes more 
real and less abstract when we think of it in terms of its 
outcome <Role Activity or performance), such as sandwich-
making. Every worker performs his or her role in a differ-
ent way than any other person in the same position. This is 
due to the uniqueness of personal attributes such as intel-
ligence, interest, etc. Workers run the packaging opera-
tion, or lettuce insertion station, for instance, but differ 
in how hard they try to make a quality sandwich, or whether 
they try to coordinate with others on the assembly line, or 
in other groups. 
The Role Network shows the function <G, A, I, or L) 
that each relationship affects. For instance, sandwich 
assembly workers have more contact with each other than with 
any other role, but they are in contact with one another 
mainly about matters of running the line <G>. Their upward 
relations with their assembly manager are requests for more 
supplies or requests for machine repair, both of which 
require changes in the environment <A>. The manager 
initiates contacts with the assembly workers to ensure that 
the line continues to function and that key variances are 
controlled <G>. The manager also communicates changes in 
production levels caused by sales <A>, and can raise the 
levels of friction and resentment between assembly workers 
and management through the tone and content of these 
instructions(!). 
Assembly workers will contact other shifts if they need 
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to pass on infot"'matlon about the line (G). Assembly WOl"'kers 
also contact other operations workers in the food prepara-
tion areas when they need additional supplies in order to 
meet increased production schedules <A>. They also contact 
other operations workers about variances like soggy bread, 
or lumpy lettuce <G>. The relations between assembly 
workers and these other operations workers are somewhat 
strained when the latter show little interest or concern in 
the former's problems (!). Assembly workers are contacted 
by warehouse and maintenance workers (A), after their needs 
for supplies or repairs are communicated through their 
manager <A>. Assembly workers contact the Personnel 
Department through their union to file grievances, espe-
cially those relating to management and supervision(!). 
Step 3: Construct the Social Systems Grid. 
The Social Systems Grid takes the combined focus of the 
four required social functions <G,A,I,L> and the particular 
relationships identified in the role network, and adds to it 
four specific relationships found in most organizations. 
The resulting grid of 16 cells draws attention. to every 
possible case of relationships fulfilling social functions 
which affect, or are affected by, the focal role and role 
senders. The four specific relationships the grid examines 
are as follows: 
1 . vertical relationships between superior and 
subordinate, 
2. horizontal relationships between the focal 
role and similar status members of his/her 
work group, 
3. cross-group relationships between the focal 
role and people in adjacent groups within the 
same Socio-Technical system, and 
4. relationships between outsiders and the focal 
role in the Socio-Technical system under 
investigation. 
In the grid in Figure 12, the use of the sandwich 
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assembly worker is continued as the focal role. In comple-
ting the grid, the user should describe behaviors or their 
absence in each of the 1 6 cells. For ''Goal Attainment'' 
behaviors <Cells G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4) cell entries can be 
drawn directly from the Table of Variance Control <Figure 9) 
for all the key variances identified in the technical system 
analysis. Behaviors for the other three rows.<A,I,L> must be 
obtained from other sources. Some information for the 16 
cells of the grid can be drawn directly from the Role 
Network (as presented in Figure 11) representing present, 
actual behavior. For example, in Cell G-3 the Assembly 
workers' attempts to communicate with Lettuce Preparation 
workers is described under "Variance 32," ~hile Cell I-3 
describes the Lettuce Preparation workers' disinterested 
response to such attempts. 
As noted, the grid also permits description of·beha-
viers that are not occurring in the achievement of essential 
functions by specified relationships. For example, beha-
viers which are not occurring, but which could be, are noted 
in Cells A-2, I-2, and L-1. Other such behaviors will be 
found throughout the grid. 
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the following way~: 
1 • Think about the entry in each cell of the 
grid. Will the continuation of the existing 
behaviors frustrate or irritate the focal 
person or others in the Role Network. 
2. Will the continuation of the existing beha-
viors improve or deteriorate organizational 
performance? 
3. Will the introduction of behaviors not 
presently occurring improve organizational 
performance or the feelings of the people 
involved? 
4. If the grid remains unchanged, will organiza-
tional effectiveness deteriorate, stay the 
same, or improve? 
Design, Analysis, or Redesign Efforts 
In this hypothetical exampl.e company, the purpose of 
the Socio-Technical Systems Analysis was to analyze an 
existing manufacturing environment and its production 
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process, rather than. to design or specifically redesign the 
system. This emphasis is consistent with many Operational 
Audits after focusing only on analysis of internal controls 
(as opposed to a formal redesign mission). As a result of 
examining their current problems of production, quality, and 
employee turnover, the CCSSC should now be clearer about the 
issues to be addressed in improving the present situation. 
However, recommendations for improvement which are developed 
as a result of this analysis are not likely to be effective 
unless they also consider the demands of employees with 
t"'e~pect t.o theh"' individual human need~. The~e demand~ 
typically focus around the following desirable job attri-
butes: 
1. friendly help from co-workers, 
2. work that is interesting, 
3. an opportunity to use your mind, 
4. work results you can see, 
5. good pay and benefits, 
6. opportunities to develop skills, 
7. participation in decisions about the job, 
8. getting help needed to do the job well, 
9. respect for the company you work for, 
10. recognition for a job well done. 
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Improvement programs should address technical, social, and 
individual demands in an integrated way, jointly optimizing 
all of them rather than maximizing performance in any one 
area at the expense of the others. 
The organization can be considered to be composed of 
control and information systems, which are then components 
of the larger system. The audit, then, is concerned with 
prescribing a control system <and corresponding information 
system) for global optimization. This is accomplished 
through analysis of the Variance Matrix. 
A close examination of the Matrix highlights the impor-
tance of both planning and operations monitoring for 
corrective actions and, thus, adaptation. If managers 
cannot foresee production problems, they cannot plan 
corrective actions, nor can they prevent problems from 
outside the production process from causing production 
problems throughout the process. Communication is important 
because the problems should be controlled at the point at 
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which contr-ols .~u-.e the least costly in t.erma of" coat to t.he 
entire organization. Similarly, if workers are not aware of 
anticipated problems and preplanned corrective actions, they 
will not control variances at the appropriate point, nor 
will they comprehend the importance of doing so. 
The information system, then, must allow managers and 
workers to anticipate problems and plan corrective actions. 
It must provide historical information about the costs of 
various problems in the past. It should also allow workers 
and management to monitor the production process in order to 
identify unexpected problems and formulate globally optimal 
solutions as quickly as possible. This requires managers to 
have the ability to identify, communicate and cooperate with 
other departments about potential interdepartmental problems 
and solutions. 
In light of these requirements, the Design Team <and 
the auditor) in this example might conclude that the control 
systems <and information system) in this example should 
possess the following characteristics: 
1. Managers in the weekly production planning 
meetings agree upon how potential problems 
are to be solved and estimate the costs of 
the required corrective actions with the help 
of past reports. This feedforward informa-
tion is coded by production cause for input 
into the MAS, and communicated to the workers 
involved. Thus, the resulting cost variances 
are anticipated and no further investigation 
is needed upon receipt of the report. 
2. Workers code production variances as they are 
incurred. Managers, in their daily monitor-
ing, thus have a more effic~ent search 
routine, and cost variance explanations are 
captured within a dynamic mode. Production 
control is facilitated by capturing this 
information as the causes are identified when 
problems arise. 
3. The Cost Variance Reports are disaggregated 
into production causes and this information 
is reported to all managers. The total costs 
of transported variances are then available 
for future planning decisions in subsequent 
production planning meetings. 
4. The managers are required to jointly recon-
cile the reports within their weekly produc-
tion planning meetings. 
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The particulars of this design are captured in the Transfer-
mation Flowchart <Figure 13). This flowchart compares the 
prescribed information system with a traditionally designed 
management accounting system. Note that in the traditional 
MAS, there is no communication between the managers - all 
information concerning controls is passed to the managers 
and the supervisors, and globally optimal controls seems 
unlikely•· Notice also that in the STSA designed MAS, the 
supervisor does not have to maintain a separate, informal 
information system for report interpretation <I.,.). 
Figure 14 is a conventional flowchart of this system, 
including relevant documents. Figure 15 is a sample of one 
of the focal documents - a redesigned Cost Variance Report. 
Note that with this report, not only are problems identi-
fled, but causes as well <so far as is possible before the 
final investigation). Problems are also coded according to 
whether they are expected or unexpected, and whether they 
were preplanned, corrected, or uncorrected. Managers can 
then focus their attention on those problems which are 
unexpected and uncorrected. 
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Managers meet in weekly production planning 
meeting to discuss previous week's problems and 
anticipated current week's problems based upon 
sales forecast, materials and labor availability 
(preventative, corrective, and detective con-
trols). 
Managers communicate anticipated problems and 
production schedules to their departmental workers 
(corrective control). 
Workers identify problems (production variances> 
as they occur. They communicate variances to 
manager and correct problems when possible 
<detective and corrective controls). 
Managers monitor operations at least daily to 
identify and correct problems <detective and 
corrective controls). 
Managers communicate with other managers on 
interdepartmental production problems (corrective 
and detective controls). 
Managers communicate with supervisor on externally 
caused problems <detective control). 
Supervisor communicates with other divisions on 
external problems <detective control>. 
Supervisor communicates results of S1 to managers 
(corrective and preventative control). 
Manager receives S1b and takes corrective actions 
by communicating to workers. If the problem will 
continue in future periods, he plans accordingly 
<corrective and future preventative control). 
Workers take corrective actions based upon 
manager's response from M~b <corrective and future 
preventative control>. 
Workers turn in material requisition forms and 
production reports during the course of opera-
tions. Time cards are turned in at the end of the 
week <detective control). 
* Code explanations: 
M =Managers' actions 
S = Supervisor's actions. 
0 = Output from the MAS. 
W =Workers' actions. 
I = Input coding activities. 
A = Analysis activities. 
FIGURE 13 <CONTINUED> 
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Time = Week :2 
M6 Manager receives weekly performance report form 
accounting and investigates unexpected cost variances 
by communicating with workers (detective control). 
S2 Supervisor receives weekly production reports from 
accounting and communication with managers for explana-
tions <detective control). 
W~ Workers provide explanations for M6 (detective con-
trol>. 
M7 Manager takes corrective actions if needed (future 
preventative control>. 
M1 Manager communicates with other managers during weekly 
production planning meeting on interdepartmentally 
caused variances that were charged to him within the 
accounting report (detective control). They also agree 
on anticipated costs of interdepartmental ·corrective 
actions planned to overcome Week 2"s problems (preven-
tative control). 
Me Manager responds to S2 and appeals interdepartmentally 
caused cost variances that he believes are not his 
responsibility (detective control>. 
S3a Supervisor communicates with other managers on appealed 
cost variances from Me (detective control). 
M~a Manager investigates causes of appealed cost variances 
from other departments by communicating with workers 
<detective control). 
Wo Workers provide explanations <detective control). 
M~b Manager responds to Supervisor and agrees to backchar-
ges or appeals <detective control>. 
M~c Manager responds to workers to prevent future problems 
from same cause <future preventative control). 
S3b Supervisor continues his investigation if cost varian-
ces are re-appealed and he ~ommunicates with managers 
on results for S3a - M~ (detective control). 
FIGURE 13 CONTINUED 
CODES FOR COMPARISON OF INFORMATION SYSTEM NETWORKS 
EXPLANATION 
Time = Week 1 
Amounts and coding of cost variances created by 
weekly adaptive production decisions from agree-
ments in weekly production planning meeting <M1 ). 
Manager communicates information from I1~ to 
workers <Me -W1 >. 
Workers code production variances as they occur. 
Manager 
reviews codes and amounts on at least a daily 
basis CW1 - M3). 
I 2 Managers agree on amounts and codes for unantici-
pated problems. This information is communicated 
back to workers for I1c <M~ - M3>. 
I3 Managers advise workers of correct codes for 
external problems <Moa - S1a,b - Mob - We>. 
I~ Workers turn in data for input into MAS CW3>. 
Time = Week 2 
01,2 Weekly accounting reports <MAS> produced and 
distributed to managers C01) and Supervisor <Oe>. 
A1 Manager investigates all significant cost varian-
ces by reconciling the report to other information 
he may have, and/or by communicating with his 
workers about causes CM6 - w~ - M7>. 
Ae Manager communicates with other managers on 
interdepartmentally .caused cost variances based 
upon A1 investigation <M1 in Week 2). 
Io Report is modified for unexpected backcharges 
agreed to by managers in Week 2's production 
planning meeting <M6 - W~ - M1 >. 
A3 Supervisor investigates appealed cost variances 
<Me - S3a). 
A~ Managers investigate and respond to A3 <M9a - Wo -
M9b - M9c >. 
FIGURE 13 <CONTINUED> 
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I6 Report is modified for unexpected backcharges notagreed 
to in A2 and appealed to supervisor in A3 <Me - M3Q -
M9a - W~ - M9b - S3b)• 
I7 Supervisor keeps secondary information for report 
interpretation and evaluation <Me - S3a - M9a,b - S3b)• 
03 Revised Cost Variance Report issued. 
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MANAGERS SUPERVISORS 




















DESCRIPTION OF REPORTS 
EXPLANATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEM 
CONTROL CODES <See Figure 13). 
Includes the current week's production 
schedule, as well as a list of amounts and 
codes for anticipated variances. <I1a,b> 
136 
Lists all variances <including codes for 
anticipated problems) which occur in produc-
tion. Also includes source of problem <if 
known> and corrective action taken (if any>. 
(!2,3) 
Lists interdepat""tmental Ol'"" external vat""iances 
and the appropriate codes and amounts as 
agreed to by managers or specified by 
supervisor. <I1c,4) 
Lists cost variances, amounts, sources of 
problems, etc. <See Figure 15>. C01,2, A1) 
Manager lists the variances, including 
codes and amounts, that he does not feel 
are his responsibility. Also includes 
reasons the manager does not think he is 
accountable for the variances, and which 
department he feels is responsible. CA2, 
1!5,6) 
A list of all variances submitted by other 
managers that could be the responsibility of 
a certain department. CA3,4> 
FIGURE 14 <CONTINUED) 
TtU: :a.\NI.JIIIIlCK t:UIU'ANY 
ASSEH!l.Y OEPA~ENT P£1ti"OR.''WIC:E REPORT 
w-1e. of a s;..tm,;:.,£ 
I In=~ Item SP . so • sc 
! areacl Sl.00/1oat I 2 S.I..I.C:eS ~ ;-oa-
i H- $4.00/lla. I 2 alic:es s .50 
i C:hee•• St .92/1~. 1 Uic:e s .12 
I lAttuc:e $1.!0/lla. 2 leaves s .10 
1 l)ir~ tAaor Sl. 75 par hOur 4 IIU.nutes s .25 
A~ual Into~ation 
~on Quou • • 9pe" 
~1 ProchM:Uon • fDE'tZ 
PKOct:c:-:lCN vuu...a C:CI)E lUtEAl) I IW'I CHEESE tzTrt:CE 1..\IOR (c:AUSZS) . usacz USAGE USAGE USioCE USAGE 
£:"'.,: 2.,;w-~ lt-~8 --,,,«:J I( 
~ c,_.,.,. J'1.#oA ~-#0" I 4SI;.~:e:<. 
'-"''"''~ /.1 r¥'t.le.£ llf.g:t8 $?.$en 
/.,rr'rrJU t.-~ ~8.44~ 14.oc~ 
I 
W'wr f!w6A >-.o~~£.. ~~.1'119 I I C. 7.S 1.( 
I 
t1'1.44r:. I .~~~I!ICI( .IS.De #" 




I I I I 
I I I I I 
'%nn.£ I I ~1.2.:&1( I !•.:~.0()1( '~7.&c;: , __ ~,.. u I --~··-. 
FIGURE 15. PRODUCTION VARIANCE REPORT 
138 
KEYS TO CODES FOR PRODUCTION VARIANCE REPORT 
Budget Information Key: 
Usage Variance = SP * <SQA- AQ) 
Where: SP = Budgeted input cost per unit of input item. 
SQA = SQ * actual production of sandwiches. 
SQ = Budgeted amount of an input item per sand-
wich. · 
AQ = Total actual amount of an input item used. 
SC = Standard cost <budgeted cost of an input item 
per sandwich). 
Key to Performance Report: 
CODE: Problems 
36.xx = Bread improperly fed into mustard machine. 
37.xx = Production quota of bottom slices not met. 
99.xx = Unidentified problem. 
etc. 
Causes 
xx.22 = Bread moisture content too high. 
xx.19 = Shortage of wax paper. 
xx.OO = Unidentified cause. 
etc. 
A = Expected and preplanned. 
B = Unexpected but corrected. 
C = Unexpected and not corrected. 
FIGURE 15 <CONTINUED> 
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Conclusion 
The Socio-Technical Systems Analysis <STSA) can be used 
to analyze, design, or redesign an organization or part 
thereof. In this chapter a hypothetical example is used to 
illustrate the methodology. The methodology includes an 
Organizational Scan <which is much like Familiarization in a 
traditional audit>, analyses of the technical and social 
systems, and an integration and synthesis of both technical 
and social requir·ement.a int.o a system that allows for• global 
optimization in task performance and control activities. 
This methodology, at first glance, may seem quite 
different from the usual Operational Audit methodology. 
However, many of the traditional Operational Auditing tools 
(flowcharts, questionnaires, interviews> can be adapted and 
extensively used in the STS analysis. The primary differ-
ence is not in the methodologies, per se, but in the 
underlying assumptions of the approach. STSA explicitly 
recognizes the social subsystem as an integral part of and a 
major constraint on the operation of the control systems 
within the organization. By carefully integrating the 
social requirements into the analysis of the organization, 
the auditor can prescribe solutions that are more meaningful 
and that workers and managers are more likely to find 
relevant and, thus, to support. 
ENDNOTES 
1. This example is a further revision of Thomas• (1985) 
revisions and extension of ••an Example Socio-Technical 
Analysis for the Cotter-Cherns Scottish Sandwich Corp., 
Ltd.'' developed by E. Lauck Parke, School of Business, 
University of Vermont. The example was originally revised 
and expanded by James C. Taylor and John J. Cotter, Center 
for Quality of Working Life, Institute of Industrial 
Relations, University of California, Los Angeles (1980). 
2. See the ••strategic Design Process•• in Robert P. Bostrom 
and Stephen J. Heinen, ''MIS Problems and Failures: A Socio-
Technical Perspective. Part I: The Causes," MIS Quarterly 
<September,· 1977), pp. 17-32 and ''MIS Problems and Failures: 
A Socio-Technical Perspective. Part II: The Application of 
Socio-Technical Theory, •• MIS quarterly (December, 1977), pp. 
11-28; and in Thomas, Michael F.,· ''An Appl !cation of Socio-
Technical Systems Analysis to Accounting Variance Control 
Theory," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 
Madison, 1985, Chapter 3. 
3. See note #1. 
4. Globally optimal controls seem unlikely in a tradition-
ally designed system due to four factors. First, there is 
no cooperation between managers because traditional Cost 
Variance Reports do not recognize the need for cooperation, 
being based on the traditional idea of division of labor. 
Second, the closed system view leaves no room for consider-
ation of possible multiple sources and causes of a variance. 
Third, there is no way to capture information on causes, 
sources, and corrective actions ex-ante to report receipt, 
resulting in managers' creating and maintaining private 
information systems. Finally, traditional information 
system design incorrectly maps the real production control 
process, because it does not recognize managers• and 
workers' ex-ante attempts at control <due to Theory X 
management styles and a Static Systems View). 
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